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BOND REQUIREMENTS UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 65(c): AN EMERGING 
EQUITABLE EXEMPTION FOR PUBLIC INTEREST 
LITIGANTS 
Reina Calderon* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the more significant legal developments of recent decades 
is the emergence of the "public interest" lawsuit. 1 Citizens seeking 
to force government or industry compliance with existing laws, or 
to effect specific legal reforms, have resorted to the courts in growing 
numbers to litigate in such areas as environmental protection, con-
sumer protection, civil rights, employment discrimination, tenants' 
rights, government benefits law, and the constitutional rights of 
prisoners, mental patients, and the handicapped. 2 In many instances, 
their access to the judicial forum has been facilitated by a legislative 
recognition that citizen enforcement is an important strategy for 
making statutes effective, because government agencies may lack 
* Executive Editor 1985-1986, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
The author wishes to express her gratitude to Professor Zygmunt J. B. Plater, Boston 
College Law School, for his assistance in the conception and realization of this article. 
1 "Public interest" and "public interest lawsuit" are difficult terms to define because the 
types of issues and interests they cover change with shifting influences upon the social fabric. 
This article subscribes to the definition of public interest law adopted by the Council for Public 
Interest Law, a definition which envisions public interest law as a response to the systemic, 
recurring problem of unequal access to legal representation: 
Public interest law is the name that has recently been given to efforts to provide 
legal representation to previously unrepresented groups and interests. Such efforts 
have been undertaken in the recognition that the ordinary marketplace for legal 
services fails to provide such services to significant segments of the population and 
to significant interests. Such groups and interests include the poor, environmentalists, 
consumers, racial and ethnic minorities, and others. 
COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING 
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN AMERICA 6-7 (1976). 
2 See Newberg, The Trial Bar's Role in Public Interest Pmctice, in PUBLIC INTEREST 
PRACTICE AND FEE AWARDS 9 (H. Newberg ed. 1980). 
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the will or resources adequately to enforce statutory directives. 3 
This recognition has resulted in the inclusion of citizen suit provisions 
in numerous federal statutes. 4 The courts too have recognized the 
efficacy of public interest litigation and have often facilitated public 
interest litigants' access to court. The courts' liberalization of the 
standing doctrine,5 and approval of the use of permanent injunctions 
to effect large-scale institutional reform,6 have made possible the 
now-familiar public interest lawsuit that utilizes injunctive relief to 
redress injury to large classes of persons or the public interest. 7 
3 Such provisions appear in a wide variety of subject areas. The following list provides a 
representative cross-section: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(0(1) (1982) (employment discrimination); Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1640(a) (1982); Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972,33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982); Fair 
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982); Title VIn of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 
42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1982) (housing discrimination). 
4 That public interest litigation is a necessary supplement to administrative enforcement 
has been a recurring theme in lawmakers' debates concerning citizen suit provisions. In the 
Senate debates surrounding the Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision, Senator Phillip Hart 
(D. Mich.), drawing upon testimony by former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, made the 
following representative statement: 
The basic argument for the [C]lean Air Act's citizen suit provision] is plain: namely, 
the Government simply is not equipped to take court action against the numerous 
violations of legislation of this type which are likely to occur. In testifying on a similar 
bill before the Senate Subcommittee on Energy, Natural Resources, and the Envi-
ronment, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark spoke convincingly of this inevi-
table incapacity. Mr. Clark stated: 
It will be impossible for government enforcement to control all significant acts of 
pollution . . . . The extension of private right . . . and effective sanctions for the persons 
directly concerned or affected will be essential if vital interests are to be protected. Our 
experience in areas of massive unlawful racial discrimination, such as in schooling, em-
ployment, and housing, tells us that however hard it might try, the government will 
never have the manpower, the techniques, or the awareness necessary to enforce the 
laws for all. Private enforcement of those laws is the only way the individual can be 
assured that their [sic] rights cannot be violated with impunity. 
116 CONGo REC. 33,104 (1970). 
5 See United States V. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973). In United States V. SCRAP, the 
Supreme Court granted standing to citizens who alleged that their interests in the recreational 
use of a national park were injured by a railroad rate increase that created a disincentive for 
using recyclable resources. Since the injury that the plaintiffs alleged was the type of gen-
eralized injury that could be shared by the public at large, United States V. SCRAP went 
beyond previous decisions restricting standing to plaintiffs alleging injury that only could be 
suffered by them individually. See also Duke Power CO. V. North Carolina Environmental 
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
6 As Professor Owen Fiss sets out in his seminal work, The Civil Rights Injunction, the 
Supreme Court's 1955 decision in Brown V. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas marked a 
turning point in the judiciary's historic disfavor of injunctive relief. After Brown, the lower 
courts used permanent injunctions as the remedy of choice for effecting institutional reform 
in school desegregation cases, as well as in many other settings involving institutional or 
administrative reformation. O. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 1-8 (1978). 
7 Public interest lawsuits need not seek injunctive relief. For example, consumer protection 
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The public interest plaintiffs' role has become widely recognized 
as legitimate, and even indispensable, in helping our governmental 
system cope with the extraordinary complexities of modern society. 
Divorced from the politics informing government decision-making, 
and motivated by incentives other than profit-making incentives, 
public interest plaintiffs represent significant interests that in the 
normal course of government and industry affairs would go unre-
presented. These interests are often "unfunded" by either govern-
ment or industry and are often "non-monetizable" as well. They are 
interests in basic civil rights, safe food and drug regulations, a clean 
environment, or fair consumer trade practices - interests that a 
majority of Americans deem important and whose representation 
provides a crucial counterweight to the government or industry 
interest in administrative convenience and economic efficiency. Pub-
lic interest suits ensure that our system of government remains 
pluralistically democratic8 - that under-represented groups and in-
terests gain recognition despite built-in systemic disincentives. 
This article focuses on preliminary injunctive relief, 9 and, in par-
ticular, the obstacle to public interest litigation presented by the 
injunction bond. 10 The preliminary injunction is an extremely impor-
litigation often takes the form of class actions seeking monetary relief. See, e.g., Ratner v. 
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). However, public 
interest litigation that seeks to address issues somewhat broader-based than unfair trade 
practices - such as racial or gender discrimination, or environmental protection - typically 
involve injunctive relief. 
8 Of course, not all government agency decisions are governed primarily by the agency's 
interest in administrative efficiency. The agency has its own public interest objectives. These 
objectives, however, are subject to the pressures shaping all government agency decision-
making: lobbying pressures from regulated parties as well as political pressures from elected 
officials pursuing their constituency's narrow interests. In addition, the agency may rely upon 
the industry it regulates for much of the information central to its policy-making. The result 
is a closed system, in which public interest litigants have frequently provided the alternative 
viewpoints necessary to the pluralism of a functioning democratic system. See generally 
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667 (1975). 
9 The preliminary injunction and the temporary restraining order are both forms of provi-
sional injunctive relief. Both provide the applicant with an equitable means of freezing activity 
of the opposing party that threatens to irreparably harm the applicant's interests. The tem-
porary restraining order operates for a limited period of time, and is obtained through an ex 
parte application process. The preliminary injunction operates for a more extended period, 
usually through the final hearing and sometimes, if there is an appeal, until the final decision. 
A preliminary injunction is obtained through a preliminary hearing, at which both sides have 
the opportunity to present legal argument and a limited opportunity to present evidence, 
usually through affidavits. See generally Developments in the Law: Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. 
REV. 994, 1055-63 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law: Injunctions]. 
10 The terms "bond" and "bonding" are used throughout this article as incorporating any 
property given as security under federal or state preliminary injunction bond requirements. 
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tant device in public interest litigation. Public interest plaintiffs' 
status as outsiders to the administrative or industry decision-making 
process results in a strategic disadvantage that necessitates prelim-
inary relief. Citizens may not be involved in decision-making pro-
cesses early enough to have a real impact, or they may be perceived 
by the agency as having no viable interest to protect, and thus they 
may be consigned to protect their interests through the medium of 
a lawsuit. 11 Lawsuits can only be successfully litigated when the 
defendant has firmly committed itself to a plan of action. 12 The 
resulting scenario, in which the plaintiff citizen public interest group 
challenges the defendant's action at the eleventh hour, necessitates 
some type of provisional remedy preventing the defendant from 
destroying the subject matter of the lawsuit. 
These requirements are typically drafted using the tenn "security;" however, the customary 
fonn of security is a bond. 
11 The strategic disadvantage of public interest litigants as outsiders to the administrative 
process, and their reliance on judicial review to protect their otherwise unrepresented inter-
ests, is demonstrated by Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 
359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). In Church of Christ, the plaintiffs challenged the FCC's license 
renewal of a station charged with maintaining racially discriminatory programming. The 
Commission had had a long history of apparent disregard for citizen complaints leveled at the 
station's practices. The court held both that the plaintiffs had standing to intervene and that 
they had the right to seek judicial review of the Commission's licensing decision. 
The subsequent history of Church of Christ demonstrates, however, that even with a right 
of intervention, citizen plaintiffs may lack the institutional clout necessary for effective agency 
interaction, and may be forced to litigate to make effective their right to intervene. Following 
the hearing mandated by the first Church of Christ decision, the FCC found that the citizen 
plaintiffs had failed to establish that the licensee's programming was racially discriminatory. 
On review, the court castigated the Commission for putting the burden of persuasion on the 
plaintiffs and for failing to develop the issues that they had presented. The court took the 
unusual step of ordering that the license renewal be vacated and that the Commission proceed 
with a fresh application. Even with the favorable first Church of Christ decision, therefore, 
citizen plaintiffs were forced to rely on a lawsuit as the effective medium through which their 
interests were recognized and protected. See Office of Communication of United Church of 
Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
12 Infonnal actions by subordinate agency staff, for instance, may not be reviewable unless 
the agency itself reviews the action, even though such infonnal action may effe(!tively foreclose 
the plaintiff's exercise of its rights. In Kixmiller v. SEC, for instance, the plaintiff stockholder 
requested a corporation to include certain proposals in its proxy materials, as required by 
Section 14 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The corporation, following procedure 
provided by SEC regulations, notified the Commission of its intention to omit the petitioner's 
proposals from its proxy materials, and requested a Division of the Commission to confirm 
that it would not urge action by the Commission. The Division issued an opinion letter stating 
that it would not recommend Commission enforcement, and the petitioner stockholder filed 
for review of the Division's action. The court held that the action was unreviewable, reasoning 
that the Commission had declined to review the Division action, and that the Commission's 
regulations providing for review of Division action only in extraordinary circumstances was 
not arbitrary or abusive. Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641, 643-46 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
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The form of relief tailor-made for such a scenario is the preliminary 
injunction, whose purpose is to preserve the status quo to prevent 
the defendant from irreparably harming the plaintiff's interests be-
fore trial. 13 Preliminary injunctions are difficult to obtain, however. 
Historically, courts have not easily granted injunctive relief. 14 In-
junctions have been viewed as overly intrusive remedies that in-
fringe upon the defendant's individual autonomy,15 and involve the 
court in time-consuming and administratively burdensome manage-
ment of the defendant's affairs. 16 Preliminary injunctions have been 
viewed as particularly problematic, since the preliminary injunction 
proceeding is an abbreviated one that affords fewer procedural pro-
tections than a trial. 17 Courts issue preliminary injunctions only in 
dire cases, where they are absolutely necessary to preserve the 
interest the plaintiff attempts to protect. 18 On the federal level, the 
courts have evolved a four-part test designed to restrict relief. 19 
The plaintiff must show that its harm is irreparable.20 This ele-
ment, which historically was essential to the court's equity jurisdic-
tion,21 provides insurance that the defendant will not be enjoined in 
13 Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1953). Preserving 
the status quo does not always mean that the injunction takes a prohibitory form. Courts may 
also issue a mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to preserve the plaintiff's interests 
before trial. See, e.g., Toledo A.A. & N.M. Ry. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 F. 730, 741 (N.D. 
Ohio, 1893). See also Developments in the Law: Injunctions, supra note 9, at 1056-59. 
14 For instance, injunctions, including preliminary injunctions, were originally available only 
to protect property interests. Developments in the Law: Injunctions, supra note 9, at 998-
99. With the changing definition of property interests, and the inclusion of injunction remedies 
in federal statutes granting private causes of action, injunctive relief has now been extended 
to protect personal as well as property interests. Id. at 998-100l. 
15Id. at 1056. 
16Id. 
17 Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 540-41 
(1978)[hereinafter cited as LeubsdorfJ; Dobbs, Should Security Be Required as a Pre-condition 
of Provisional Relief?, 52 N.C.L. REV. 1091, 1091-92 (1974)[hereinafter cited as Dobbs]. 
18 Dobbs, supra note 17, at 1092. 
19 See, e.g,. Minnesota PIRG v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584, 625 (D. Minn. 1973), aff'd, 498 F.2d 
1314 (8th Cir. 1974); Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 92, 95-97 (D. Minn. 1970). 
See also Leshy, Interlocutory Relief in Environmental Cases: A Primer for the Practitioner, 
6 EcoLOGY L.Q. 639, 641 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Leshy]. The federal courts do not 
necessarily give equal weight to each of the four factors in all cases, however, and there is 
variation between courts in the formulation of the separate elements of the test. Leubsdorf, 
supra note 17, at 525-26. In some courts, for instance, the test's irreparable harm requirement 
is presumptively met if the defendant's conduct threatens to violate a statutory prohibition. 
See Developments in the Law: Injunctions, supra note 9, at 1059. 
00 Cox, 319 F. Supp. at 96. 
21 Leubsdorf, supra note 17, at 530. The historical division between law courts and equity 
courts resulted in use of the irreparable injury requirement as a method of determining 
jurisdiction. Where the injury with which the plaintiff was threatened could be adequately 
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cases where, it is unnecessary - where the plaintiff ean be fully 
compensated by final relief in the form of money damages. 22 
The plaintiff must also show that it has a likelihood of success on 
the merits.23 This element, which places upon the plaintiff the burden 
of arguing and proving its case in chief, allows the court to weigh 
the probable likelihood that the defendant will be erroneously en-
joined.24 
The plaintiff must prove that, on balance, the denial of an injunc-
tion poses graver harm to its interests than the grant of an injunction 
poses to the defendant's interests. 25 This element ensures that relief 
will only issue where a balance of the equities favors it. In the case 
of public interest suits, where both sides only putatively represent 
their own interests and really represent conflicting public interests, 
the balance ensures that the court will weigh the particular public 
interest that the plaintiff represents against that represented by the 
defendant. 26 
Finally, the plaintiff must prove that the preliminary injunction 
will not adversely affect the public interest. 27 This element ensures 
that the court considers affected interests extending far beyond the 
parties' interests - that it considers the wide social and economic 
impact of an injunction. 28 
The preliminary injunction test is not the only obstacle public 
interest plaintiffs face, however. Public interest plaintiffs' claims for 
redressed by an award of money damages, it was not irreparable, and equity had no jurisdiction 
to grant an injunction. See id. 
Z2 For a contemporary statement of the irreparability of injury requirement's function as a 
limitation upon the unnecessary issuance of injunctive relief, see Cox, 319 F. Supp. at 96 
("Injuries, no matter how substantial, which can be ascertained or approximated and ade-
quately compensated at law do not provide a basis for equitable relief."). 
2S See Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. 
Cir. 1958); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 296 F. Supp. 456, 459 (D. 
Conn. 1968). 
24 In Florida Wildlife Federation v. Goldschmidt, for instance, the court reviewed the 
plaintiff's argument that the defendant's environmental impact statement was inadequate, 
focusing on the inadequacy of the plaintiff's proof. See Florida Wildlife Fed'n v. Goldschmidt, 
506 F. Supp. 350, 374-78 (S.D. Fla. 1981). 
26 Cox, 319 F. Supp. at 96. 
26 In Florida Wildlife Federation v. Goldschmidt, for instance, the court found persuasive 
the fact that the defendant government's damages amounted to a loss of tax revenues, and 
considered this factor, in its balancing of harms, to weigh against issuance of an injunction. 
506 F. Supp. at 371. 
27 See, e.g., Canal Authority of State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 
1974). 
28 See, e.g., Croskey St. Concerned Citizens v. Romney, 459 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1972) (court 
denied preliminary injunction to citizens challenging discriminatory location of public housing 
because of urgent need for low-cost public housing.). 
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injunctive relief are often blocked by other obstacles that are exter-
nal to the legal system and that stack the deck against a favorable 
outcome. These obstacles include unavailability of counsel,29 lack of 
access to factual information or technical advice,30 or limited admin-
istrative resources. 31 Chief among these constraints, and their un-
derlying cause, is public interest plaintiffs' lack of money.32 Public 
interest plaintiffs represent unfunded citizen voluntarism in their 
efforts. They typically have no money and their litigation makes no 
money. All too frequently, they are ad hoc citizen groups with no 
paid legal staff33 and are supported entirely by donations. 34 Formed 
quickly, often in reaction to single, topical, local issues,35 these citizen 
groups may lack the institutional status and name recognition essen-
tial to effective fundraising. Even if the organization is an established 
legal defense group capable of successful fundraising, its methods of 
financing litigation are likely to be more limited than those of the 
typical "private interest" corporate litigant. Most public interest 
groups are nonprofit and thus cannot pass onto the consumer the 
costs of litigation. Moreover, the remedy typically sought by public 
interest litigants is nonmonetary, eliminating opportunities for con-
tingent fee financing. For, unlike most private interest litigants, who 
often pay for at least a portion of their litigation costs through 
damage awards, public interest litigants typically seek injunctive 
relief. 36 
Recognizing that this situation has a chilling effect upon the liti-
gation of worthwhile public interest lawsuits, Congress and the 
courts have adjusted certain of the procedural rules governing liti-
gation expenses to ensure judicial access for public interest litigants. 
29 King & Plater, The Right to Counsel Fees in Public Interest Environmental Litigation, 
41 TENN. L. REV. 27, 29 (1973) [hereinafter cited as King & Plater]. 
30 Id. 
3! See Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administra-
tive Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 618 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sive]. 
32 King & Plater, supra note 29, at 29. 
33 Henson & Gray, Injunction Bonding in Environmental Litigation, 19 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 541, 554 and n.83 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Henson & Gray]. 
34 See Sive, supra note 31, at 618. 
36 A survey of the names of public interest cases indicates how topical and local such public 
interest groups can be. See, e.g., Committee to Save the Bishop's House v. Medical Center 
Hospital of Vermont, 136 Vt. 312, 388 A.2d 827 (1978); Citizens Responsible for Area Growth 
(CRAG) v. Adams, 477 F. Supp. 984 (1979); Save EI Toro v. Days, 74 Cal. App. 3d 64, 141 
Cal. Rptr. 282 (1977). In the environmental area, as of 1973, only fifteen percent of major 
environmental cases were litigated by the three major national public interest environmental 
groups - the Environmental Defense Fund, the Sierra Club, and the Natural Resources 
Defense Council. King & Plater, supra note 29, at 75 and n.220. 
36 King & Plater, supra note 29 at 29. 
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For example, in the counsel fees area, Congress has passed more 
than eighty-five statutes specifically providing for fee-shifting,37 cre-
ating statutory exceptions to the traditional American rule38 requir-
ing each party to bear its own counsel fees and court costs. While 
the Supreme Court has limited, with a few equitable exceptions, the 
award of counsel fees to cases brought under statutes authorizing 
them,39 the state courts are free to award counsel and expert witness 
fees based on· general equitable balancing. They have occasionally 
done so despite the absence of an authorizing statute, where the 
litigation vindicated an important public policy requiring private 
enforcement. 4o The cases have been no windfall, however. Plaintiffs 
must "prevail," judges may be unfriendly, and awards are often 
niggardly.41 Plaintiffs thus have to run a difficult obstacle course -
they must prevail on the merits of the litigation with the external 
obstacle of front-end financing, even where there is a possibility of 
eventual recovery of fees. The obstacles are given a quantum and 
often insurmountable boost by the injunction bond requirement. 
Injunction bonding is a major potential litigation cost affecting 
public interest litigants' access to court. In theory, in the federal 
courts42 and virtually all state courts43 applicants for preliminary 
injunctions who have successfully established all the required ele-
ments for equitable relief will nevertheless be denied it if they do 
not post these bonds, which may involve very large sums of money. 44 
37 Newberg, Preface to PUBLIC INTEREST PRACTICE AND FEE AWARDS v (H. Newberg, 
ed. 1980). 
38 See King & Plater, supra note 29, at 30. 
33 See Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
40 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303 (1977). 
41 Trial judges do not enjoy being reversed, and may be especially ill-disposed to granting 
counsel fees to plaintiffs who have received an appellate reversal of an unfavorable decision. 
In Hill v. TV A, for instance, the district judge who had refused to enjoin construction of the 
Tellico Dam, and subsequently had been reversed, dismissed the plaintiffs' petition for an 
award of counsel fees, stating: "It seems to the Court that the tax payers and rate payers 
have already been taxed to the limit in this litigation. In the opinion of the Court, the award 
of attorney's fees and further costs in this case is not appropriate." 84 F.R.D. 226, 229 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1979). 
42 The applicable federal provision is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c): 
SECURITY. No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon 
the giving of security by the applicant in such sum as the court deems proper, for 
the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party 
who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. No such security shall 
be required of the United States or an officer or agency thereof. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). 
43 Whether the applicable bond provision is contained in a statute or a code of civil procedure 
varies from state to state. Virtually all states, however, have some type of codified security 
requirement. See Dobbs, supra note 17, at 1096-97. 
44 See Friends of the Earth v. Brinegar, Inc., 518 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1975) ($4,500,000 bond); 
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As developed by the equity courts,45 the bond requirement had 
two primary purposes, both focused on protecting the preliminary 
injunction defendant from the monetary loss resulting from an im-
providently issued injunction. First, in the event of an erroneous 
issuance of relief, the bond provided the defendant with a source of 
compensation.46 Its second function was to deter plaintiffs from filing 
frivolous claims for relief,47 thus saving the defendant from the ex-
pense and nuisance of defending itself in a preliminary injunction 
hearing. An applicant's failure to post bond allowed the defendant 
to motion for a dissolution of the injunction. 48 Where a preliminary 
injunction was necessary to prevent the defendant from taking an 
action that would moot the applicant's lawsuit, the applicant had to 
comply with the bond requirement to preserve the justiciability of 
its case. The bond requirement appears to have been developed 
primarily in cases involving profit-making, commercial adversaries, 
a setting in which litigation is a cost of doing business and a bond is 
a perfectly logical method for preventing frivolous and expensive 
litigation. This traditional setting fundamentally contrasts with the 
setting of public interest litigation, since public interest plaintiffs 
cannot be assumed to have the money to post bonds. 
It is usually quite difficult for public interest litigants to fulfill bond 
requirements. If courts refuse to require a bond, or make nominal 
the bond requirement, public interest litigation can proceed. If, on 
the other hand, courts set bond amounts according to the defendant's 
projected damages,49 rather than the applicant's ability to pay, bond 
amounts may be so high that public interest litigants can undertake 
neither the bond premium nor the personal liability that posting 
bond entails. 50 Thus, they may be financially barred from obtaining 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 167 (D. D.C. 1971), aff'd on other 
grounds, 458 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ($750,000 bond increased by $2,500,000 per month of 
delay in construction); Powelton Civic Homeowners Ass'n v. Department of Housing and 
Urban Dev. (HUD), 284 F. Supp. 809, 840 (E.D. Pa. 1968) ($20,000,000 bond). 
46 In Russell v. Farley, the Supreme Court case presenting the history of the injunction 
bond requirement, the Court states that injunction bonding is mentioned in Chief Baron 
Gilbert's Forum Romanum. The earliest case cited by the Court dates from 1801. See Russell 
v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433, 438 (1881) (citing Marquis of Downshire v. Lady Sandys, 6 Ves. Jr. 
107 (1801». 
46 See infra text and notes at notes 90-92. 
47 See infra text and notes at notes 93-94. 
4B Note, Interlocutory Injunctions and the Injunction Bond, 73 HARV. L. REV. 333, 338 
(1959) [hereinafter cited as Interlocutory Injunctions]. 
49 See, e.g., Brashear Freight Lines v. Public Servo Comm'n, 41 F. Supp. 952, 953 (W.D. 
Mo. 1941). The amount of the bond is within the discretion of the trial judge in the federal 
courts. See J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 65.09, at 65-94. 
50 In addition to the bond premium, bonded applicants are potentially liable to the surety 
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preliminary injunctive relief, despite establishing that the equitable 
considerations51 governing the judicial decision to grant an injunction 
lie in their favor. In some circumstances, this may mean that a 
dangerous drug goes on the market, or a potentially dangerous 
project or process goes into production, for want of the plaintiffs' 
cash. 
For public interest plaintiffs, the ramifications of the injunction 
bond requirement are far-reaching. The frequent status of public 
interest plaintiffs as outsiders to the administrative or corporate 
decision-making process, without prior knowledge of governmental 
decisions, often necessitates that they challenge the defendant's 
pending action at the last possible moment:52 when the defendant's 
activities are about to ruin an irreplaceable tract of urban park land, 53 
or when a municipality is about to engage in the discriminatory 
delivery of an important municipal service. 54 In such circumstances, 
a preliminary injunction is the only way that the public interest 
litigant can preserve its ability to litigate. If the defendant is allowed 
to destroy the park land, or to disburse the funds, the public interest 
plaintiff, and the public, lose forever the object of protection. 55 Often, 
on the injunction bond. See Dobbs, supra note 17, at 1112. Improperly enjoined applicants 
may collect such damages as they can prove after a decision that an injunction was erroneously 
granted. See id. at 1122. 
61 The equitable considerations underlying a grant of preliminary injunctivE! relief are artic-
ulated by the preliminary injunction test. 
62 The following quotation characterizes the position of many public interest litigants: 
The inequality of information results from the fact that generally the project, which 
is the subject of the litigation, has been planned, studied, engineered, and reported 
on in detail over a period of years culminating in the final government action that 
triggers litigation, before which final action may be premature. 
Such prior administrative action is often informal and non-adversary. There may 
be little opportunity for public knowledge or participation. In those cases where there 
is public participation, there simply may not be the means available for citizens to 
participate effectively . . . . 
Even in those cases in which ... there has been public participation, ... such 
proceedings seldom provide the means of discovery available in plenary actions. . . . 
Time is often pressing. A large percentage of environmental suits - typically de-
claratory judgment and injunction suits - are brought in the figurative shadow of 
the bulldozer. They often feature preliminary injunction motions, necessary to render 
trial and a meaningful final judgment. 
Sive, Successful Conduct of a Public Interest Environmental Practice, in PUBLIC INTEREST 
PRACTICE AND FEE AWARDS 427 (R. Newberg ed. 1980). 
58 See, e.g., Clements v. Chicago Park Dist., 96 Ill. 2d 26, 449 N.E.2d 81 (1983) (citizen 
challenge to addition of a driving range to Chicago park designed by Frederick Law Olmsted). 
64 See, e.g., Bartels v. Biernat, 405 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (handicapped plaintiffs' 
challenge to Milwaukee's signing construction contract for buses before taking account of 
needs of handicapped persons using city bus service). 
66 The dilemma the applicant faces was aptly stated by the court in Powelton Civic Home 
,Owners Ass'n v. Department of Housing and Urban Dev.: 
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the statute granting such litigants a cause of action does not provide 
for damage awards,56 and in any case the public interest plaintiff's 
role as a vindicator of the public interest makes an award of damages 
inappropriate. The bond requirement thus effectively blocks the 
litigation of public interest suits by preventing public interest plain-
tiffs from obtaining preliminary injunctions. It also requires public 
interest plaintiffs not only to volunteer their time, energies, and 
limited funds to· presenting public interest cases, but also to under-
take to subsidize the defendant as if both parties were commercial 
competitors. Public interest plaintiffs are faced with a high stakes 
gamble: if they lose on the merits they not only have no hope of 
reimbursement for court costs, but also lose the "wager" of the bond. 
The arguments supporting the bond requirement today are essen-
tially the same as at its genesis: (1) the deterrence of frivolous claims 
for relief; (2) the indemnification of the defendant in case of an 
erroneously issued injunction. Set against these concerns, however, 
are a wider series of propositions developed by the courts, as this 
article will note, which have from time to time prompted them to 
decline to require bonds,57 or, alternatively, to "nominalize,"58 bonds. 
Exercising their equitable discretion and harkening back to the tra-
ditional scope of equitable discretion, the courts have taken account 
of the special setting of public interest litigation, a setting distinct 
from the private interest "commercial" setting. The propositions 
supporting a public interest bond exemption have included: 
(1) The legislature intends that citizen plaintiffs enforce a stat-
ute, providing a policy reason to exempt bond requirements. 59 
It is obvious that the plaintiffs who are merely residents of the proposed project site 
are unlikely ever to be able to meet such an onerous [bond] requirement. Should the 
plaintiffs have been unable to meet the requirement in this case, the court could not 
have issued the preliminary injunction. Disbursement of the federal funds then would 
have mooted the issues in the case and precluded effective review of the Secretary's 
decision to authorize funds. 
284 F. Supp. 809, 839 (E.D. Pa. 1968). 
66 Lawmakers often limit statutory remedies to injunctive relief to insure that parties are 
not encouraged to file frivolous claims. In the Senate debates surrounding the Clean Air Act's 
citizen suit provision, both Senator Hart's and the Legal Advisory Committee of the Council 
on Environmental Quality's submitted statements focused on the absence of a damages pro-
vision to refute the argument that the citizen suit provision would result in large numbers of 
frivolous lawsuits. 116 CONGo REC. 33,103-04. 
57 See, e.g., Bass v. Richardson, 338 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N. Y. 1971). 
58 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) leaves the amount of the bond discretionary. Thus, 
even under a mandatory interpretation of the Rule judges can "nominalize" bond requirements 
by requiring only a nominal bond. See, e.g., West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v, Island 
Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971). 
59 See infra text and notes at notes 145-55, 164-84. 
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(2) The public interest value of the lawsuit outweighs the 
possible damage to the defendant, and the court, in a balancing 
of "public" equities, creates an equitable private attorney general 
exemption. 60 
(3) The plaintiffs are indigents, and it would be unjust to 
impose bond requirements, a proposition that often incorporates 
some latent consideration of the indigents' status as public in-
terest plaintiffs. 61 
(4) Frivolous claims are adequately screened out by the pre-
liminary injunction test - particularly the likelihood of success 
on the merits element - and by the nearly insurmountable 
financial obstacles to public interest litigation. 62 
(5) Relative to the plaintiff, the defendant is better able to 
bear the financial burden of an erroneous issuance of relief and, 
in the case of a defendant who has violated a statute, should 
rightfully be required to bear it. 63 
(6) A systemic need exists for having justiciable cases adju-
dicated, as opposed to being squeezed out of court onto the 
streets. 64 
Recognizing that bond requirements can bar public interest liti-
gants' access to court, the federal courts have fairly consistently 
decided not to require bonds in two frequent settings - cases 
brought by indigents65 and those brought by citizen groups enforcing 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).66 This limited case 
law might tend to relieve the burden on plaintiffs in appropriate 
60 See infra text and notes at notes 158-63. 
61 See infra text and notes at notes 138-63. 
62 See infra text and notes at notes 145-57. 
68 See infra text and notes at notes 153-58. 
64 See infra text and notes at notes 142--45. 
66 See, e.g., Denny v. Health and Social Servs. Bd., 285 F. Supp. 526, 527 (E.D. Wis. 1968); 
Bass v. Richardson, 338 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N. Y. 1971); Bartels v. Biernat, 405 F. Supp. 1012 
(E.D. Wis. 1975); Wayne Chern., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Service Corp., 567 F.2d 692 (1977); 
Marsh v. Moore, 325 F. Supp. 392 (D. Mass. 1971). For an early article 011 the indigent 
exception, see generally Blood, Injunction Bonds: Equal Protection for the Indigent, 11 S. 
TEX. L. J. 16 (1969). 
66 See, e.g., West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 
(4th Cir. 1971); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. a56 (E.D.N.C. 
1972), remanded, 473 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1972), on remand, 355 F. Supp. 280 (D.C.N.C. 1973); 
Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1971), af!'d, 
458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973); 
Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Volpe, 349 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Hawaii 1972); Boston Waterfront Residents 
v. Romney, 343 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1972). But see Anaconda v. Ruckelshaus, 352 F. Supp. 
697 (D. Colo. 1972), rev'd, 482 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1973) ($30,000 bond required); Monarch 
Chern. Works, Inc. v. Exon, 452 F. Supp. 493 (D. Neb. 1978) ($10,000 bond required). See 
generally, Note, Injunction Bond Amounts in Federal NEPA Litigation, 61 IOWA L. REV. 
580 (1975). For a general article focusing upon the injunction bond's impact on environmental 
litigation, see Henson & Gray, Injunction Bonding in Environmental Litigation, 19 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 541 (1979). 
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public interest cases generally, only the courts have to date not 
broadly extended67 the principle that nonprofit public interest plain-
tiffs are different from commercial adversaries and require different 
treatment. The NEP A litigation exemption, which most closely ap-
proaches a general public interest exemption, appears to be limited 
to public interest organizations enforcing NEP A. Its basis - that 
NEPA's private attorney general enforcement scheme mandates an 
exemption to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure bond provision68 
- has afforded limited room for expansion. Thus, even public inter-
est plaintiffs litigating in federal court under statutes granting pri-
vate causes of action may be unable to argue for an analogous ex-
emption. They may have difficulty convincing a court that the NEP A 
exemption's status as a "public interest" bond exemption is sufficient 
reason to depart from Rule 65(c). From an overview perspective, it 
is interesting to note that NEP A as a statute has no particular 
requirements for citizen enforcement69 which would distinguish it 
from the large number of other federal statutes which have not 
received widespread exemptions. Most commentators agree that 
citizen enforcement was never intended, for NEPA's legislative his-
tory shows that it was never intended. 70 If the exemption is appro-
priate in NEP A cases, it is appropriate at least where other statutes 
clearly focus on citizen enforcement. 
Since it applies only to poor persons, the indigent exemption has 
provided limited room for expansion. While the federal courts have 
on occasion exempted from bond requirements indigent plaintiffs 
litigating constitutional issues71 or those seeking judicial review of 
administrative action,72 these cases have not been widely used to 
formulate a broad-based exemption. 
State courts are even less likely to exempt public interest plaintiffs 
from bond requirements than are federal courts. A small number of 
state courts have created a bond exemption for indigents,73 or have 
67 The indigent and NEPA bond exceptions cases have developed with some cross-fertiliza-
tion. However, with the exception of one case, the federal courts have not developed a broad 
public interest exemption. The exception is Crowley v. Local No. 82 Furniture and Piano 
Movers, 679 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 2557 (1984). For a 
discussion of Crowley and related case law, see infra notes 185-201 and accompanying text. 
68 For the text of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), see supra note 42. 
69 See King & Plater, supra note 29, at 27 and n.2. 
70 F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 1-15, (1973). 
71 See Denny v. Health and Social Servo Bd., 285 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Wis. 1968). 
72 See, e.g., Bass v. Richardson, 338 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Powelton Civic Home 
Owners Ass'n v. Department of Housing and Urban Dev., 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968). 
73 See, e.g., Andres v. Fowler, 423 So. 2d 838, 840 (1982) (dicta); Lightsey v. Kensington 
Mortgage and Finance Corp., 294 Ala. 281, 285, 315 So. 2d 413,434 (1975) (dicta). 
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alluded in dicta to the existence of a public interest exemption. 74 The 
majority of state bond provisions appear to be stated in mandatory 
terms. 75 Indeed, state courts have typically considered bonds nec-
essary in all but a few isolated instances. Even where state courts 
find persuasive the precedent provided by the federal bond exemp-
tions, the tendency has been to construe the exemption narrowly. 76 
The bond requirement's origins suggest, however, that courts 
need not limit bond exemptions to indigents or to those litigating 
under statutes contemplating a private enforcement mechanism. In-
vented by the equity courts, traditionally the bond requirement was 
associated with an equitable tailoring of relief. 77 Since tailoring of 
relief was an area characterized by the judicial flexibility that is a 
hallmark of equity jurisprudence, 78 courts could waive bond require-
ments on a case-by-case basis.79 Thus, under an equity conception of 
the bond, requirement, exemptions could be made at the court's 
discretion, and need not be limited to cases where a statutory policy 
provided a reason for an exemption. 
Today, bond requirements are codified on both the federal80 and 
state81 level, making the court's ability to grant exemptions largely 
a matter of statutory interpretation. Statutory and rule of civil 
procedure bond requirements may control a court's decision to re-
74 See, e.g., Andres, 423 So. 2d at 840; Town of Cicero v. Weilander, 35 IlL App. 2d 456, 
183 N.E.2d 40, 48 (1962) (dicta). At least one state has excepted bond requirements where 
the plaintiff seeks judicial review of administrative action. See Damaskos v. Board of Appeals, 
359 Mass. 59, 267 N.E.2d 897 (1971) (statute providing for judicial review of zoning board 
appeals decisions contained discretionary bond provision). 
75 Dobbs, supra note 17, at 1096-99 and notes 14-33. 
76 For instance, in Committee to Save the Bishop's House v. Medical Center of Vermont, a 
case in which citizen plaintiffs attempted to prevent the demolition of a local landmark, the 
court treated as inapposite the NEPA bond exception, even though the case was one with 
environmental impact. 388 A.2d 827 (1978). 
77 See infra text and notes at note 85. 
78 Judicial flexibility in tailoring remedies is characteristic of equitable discretion. The classic 
statement of equity's discretionary ability to tailor relief is contained in Hecht v. Bowles, 321 
U.S. 321 (1944): 
The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity 
and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather 
than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and practicality have made 
equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public 
interest and private needs as well as between competing private claims .... 
[d. at 329-30. 
79 See infra text and notes at notes 97-107. 
80 Dobbs, supra note 17, at 1099. 
81 [d. at 1096-97. 
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quire bond, but recent cases82 on the federal level suggest a trend 
towards a more discretionary approach than the mandatory language 
of the federal provision, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), might 
seem to warrant. 83 The evolving federal case law indicates that the 
federal courts are in the process of recognizing a general "equitable" 
public interest bond exemption - an exemption based on their eq-
uitable power discretionarily to except applicants from bond require-
ments. 
This article charts the development of this federal equitable dis-
cretionary bond exemption, and uses the emerging exemption as a 
model to argue that courts should exempt public interest applicants 
from bond requirements whenever necessary to ensure judicial ac-
cess. Section II presents a short history of the bond requirement, 
focusing on the requirement's equity origins, the equity courts' dis-
cretion to except applicants from bond requirements, and the ability 
of modern courts to do the same under various mandatory provisions. 
Section III presents several federal court decisions that suggest a 
return to an equity conception of bonding requirements, as well as 
the continuing development of an equitable exemption for public 
interest litigants. Section IV discusses contemporary arguments in 
support of such a exemption, including that a mechanical imposition 
of bond requirements interferes with the courts' ability to adjudicate 
justiciable questions; that the bond's deterrence and compensatory 
functions do not come into play in public interest cases; and that the 
preliminary injunction test adequately protects defendants from the 
possibility of an erroneously issued injunction. It concludes that, at 
the federal level, and in states patterning their bond requirement 
practices after the federal practice,84 public interest litigants should 
be excepted from bond requirements whenever bonds would effec-
tively bar judicial access. 
82 See infra text and notes at notes 138-201. 
88 For the text of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), see supra note 42. The federal 
rules have the status of law, as they are enacted by Congress after being promulgated by the 
Supreme Court. Both courts and counsel are bound by the rules. See 1 C. WRIGHT AND A. 
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND FEDERAL PROCEDURE, § 1030 (1969). Thus, if Rule 65(c) 
is a mandatory provision, the courts are bound to follow it; if, on the other hand, it is a 
discretionary provision, courts may except applicants from bond requirements. See infra text 
and notes at notes 114-23 for a discussion of the current views of the rule's mandatory or 
discretionary status. 
84 A consideration of how the emerging federal exception would apply on the state level is 
beyond the scope of this article. The federal exception provides, however, a model for state 
courts that have created exceptions to mandatory bond requirements, find the federal practice 
persuasive, or consider their jurisdiction's bond provision discretionary. 
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II. THE HISTORY OF THE BOND REQUIREMENT 
A. The Equity Origins of the Bond Requirement 
Originally, equity courts did not impose a bond requirement upon 
successful applicants for preliminary injunctive relief. To ensure that 
the defendant would not be erroneously enjoined, they relied instead 
upon the equitable balancing that determined whether an injunction 
would issue. The injunction bond requirement was a later develop-
ment, an extension of the equity court's power to impose conditions 
upon a party upon whose behalf it acted.85 It developed in response 
to the judicial perception that the preliminary injunction proceeding 
exposed defendants to a substantial risk of erroneous relief.86 This 
perception was based on the notion that the short time during which 
the enjoined party must prepare its case compromised its ability to 
defend itself at the preliminary injunction proceeding.87 The equity 
courts reasoned that, because the applicant would be better prepared 
than the enjoined party, the judge would be overly swayed by its 
case and would fail to detect inconsistencies.88 To protect the defen-
dant, equity courts instituted the bond requirement. 89 
At the basis of the requirement, then, was the premise that plain-
tiffs were likely to be in a more dominant position. This premise was 
based on the supposition that the injunction plaintiff enjoyed a pro-
cedural advantage as the initiator of the action, a procedural advan-
tage that was not offset by any inequality of financial resources or 
86 Russell, 105 U.S. at 438. 
86 See Smith v. Day, 21 Ch. D. 421, 424 (C.A. 1882), where the court gave the following 
historical explanation for the bond requirement: 
[It] was invented by Lord Justice Knight Bruce when Vice Chancellor, and was 
originally inserted only in ex parte orders for injunctions. Its object was, so to say, 
to protect the Court as well as the Defendant from improper applications for injunc-
tions. If the evidence in support of the application suppressed or misrepresented 
facts, the Court was enabled not only to punish the Plaintiff but to compensate the 
Defendant. By degrees, the practice has extended to all cases of interlocutory in-
junction. The reason for this extension was that though when the application was 
disposed of on notice, there was not the same opportunity for concealment or mis-
representation, still, owing to the shortness of time allowed, it was often difficult for 
the Defendant to get up his case properly, and as the evidence was taken by affidavit, 
and generally without cross-examination, it was impossible to decide on which side 
the truth lay. The Court therefore required the undertaking in order that it might 
be able to do justice if it had been induced to grant the injunction by false statement 
or suppression. 
[d. at 424. 
In [d. 
B8 [d. 
89 [d. 
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information that impaired its ability to present its case. This sup-
position does not exist when public interest plaintiffs with limited 
funds challenge established and well-funded governmental and cor-
porate interests. There, the public interest litigant's limited funds 
may compromise its ability to prepare its case, and its position as 
an outsider to government or corporate decision-making may mean 
that it applies for an injunction from a relatively weak position. In 
short, the bond requirement appears to have developed in a context 
in which each party had financial and administrative parity, and in 
which an injunction bond requirement was therefore a fair method 
of equalizing the procedural advantage that the plaintiff had as the 
initiator of the action. These conditions simply do not exist in a 
public interest context. 
In the commercial context, therefore, the bond requirement was 
a logical and fair method of protecting the enjoined party. Consistent 
with its private interest origins, the requirement's main function 
was to provide the defendant with a means of compensation should 
the injunction turn out to have been issued erroneously.90 Before 
such a requirement, an erroneously enjoined party had no such 
recourse. In order to recover for harm resulting from a preliminary 
injunction, the defendant was forced to become a plaintiff in a ma-
licious prosecution suit. 91 The bond requirement increased the num-
bers of situations in which the enjoined party could recover. It also 
facilitated the enjoined party's recovery, since the party did not have 
to file a separate tort action. It had only to collect its damages from 
the bond. 92 
The bond requirement also protected the enjoined party by func-
tioning as a screening device, to deter applicants with frivolous 
claims from filing for relief. 93 Theoretically, both the bond's expense 
and the threat of personal liability that posting bond entailed would 
discourage frivolous suits. 94 
In addition to protecting the enjoined party, the equity courts may 
have conceived the bond requirement to be a means for punishing 
the applicant who abusively appealed to the Chancellor's conscience 
to obtain relief. At the time that the bond requirement developed, 
courts viewed injunctive relief with disfavor. They reserved the 
90 BEACH, INJUNCTIONS § 158, at 177-78 (1891). 
91 American Circular Loom Co. v. Wilson, 198 Mass. 182, 211, 84 N.E. 133, 139 (1908); 
Russell, 105 U.S. at 438. 
92 Griffith v. Blake, 27 Ch. D. 474, 476 (1884). 
93 Smith, 21 Ch. D. at 424 . 
.. Dobbs, supra note 17, at 1093-94. 
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pennanent injunction as a remedy of last resort, and limited its 
availability to the protection of property interests. 95 Since the pre-
liminary injunction required the enjoined party to refrain from con-
duct without a full hearing on the merits, it was viewed as an even 
less desireable remedial device than the pennanent injunction. In 
view of equity's inherent power to do justice between the parties,96 
courts may have used the bond as an efficient and economical way 
of applying sanctions against ill-considered applicants. 
Prior to enactment of mandatory bond provisions, courts treated 
flexibly the decision to require a bond, as they treated flexibly the 
underlying decision to grant a preliminary injunction. In 1889, the 
British treatise writer Kerr stated that "bond may be required in 
doubtful cases"97 and that "where the equity of the plaintiff is per-
fectly clear, or where the damage, if any, which might accrue is of 
a vague and uncertain nature, the undertaking will not be re-
quired. "98 This indicates that British equity courts looked upon bond-
ing as an issue to be detennined on a case-by-case basis, subject to 
such factors as the defendant's need for protection and the strength 
of the plaintiff's underlying claim for preliminary relief. American 
courts considered these, as well as other factors, as elements of the 
equity court's power to effect a fair compromise between the parties' 
individual interests and the public interest. 
For instance, in the case of Dodd v. Flavell,99 decided in 1865, a 
New Jersey equity court, without requiring the plaintiff to post 
bond, enjoined a defendant-mill owner from flooding the plaintiff's 
land. The court reasoned that "the right of the complainant is clear, 
and the infraction of that right is established."I°O This case may 
indicate that American equity courts may have exempted the plain-
tiff from bond requirements even where the the defendant would 
certainly suffer damage, so long as that damage was not likely to be 
legally cognizable. "Under such circumstances," the Dodd court went 
on, "the fact that the injunction occasions a serious loss to the 
defendant affords no just ground of complaint. He is deprived of the 
enjoyment of that which rightfully belongs to another. "101 Essen-
96 See Developments in the Law: Injunctions, supra note 9, at 998-99. 
96 A court's power to tailor relief to do substantial justice is a quintessential aspect of equity 
jurisprudence. See supra note 78. 
In KERR, INJUNCTIONS 76 (1889). 
98 Id. at 565. 
99 See Dodd v. Flavel, 2 C. E. Green 255 (1865). 
100 Id. at 257. 
101Id. 
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tially, the Dodd court looked to the merits of the case to determine 
if a bond should be required. Because the plaintiff had, in modern 
terminology, a strong "likelihood of success on the merits," the court 
declined to require a bond. The Dodd court's approach resembles 
the approach of some modern federal public interest cases, where 
the courts exempt bond requirements because the plaintiff has shown 
it has a likelihood of success on the merits. 102 
American equity courts also considered factors external to the 
strength of the plaintiff's claim or the defendant's prospective harm, 
acting in their capacity to do substantial justice between the parties. 
In the 1892 case of Pasteur Chamberland Filter Co. v. Funk,103 for 
instance, a federal court sitting in Illinois refused to intervene on 
the behalf of an enjoined party to require a bond because the party 
had acted in bad faith towards the applicant. Apparently, the courts 
also had the power to look beyond the parties, themselves, and to 
balance the public equities. In early cases at least one state court 
recognized that bond requirements could and should be waived 
where the plaintiff's petition sought to protect the public interest. 104 
In summary, bond requirements seemed to partake of the ad hoc 
balancing processes of equity. The United States Supreme Court in 
Russell v. Farley105 concluded that, in the absence of a mandatory, 
statutory bond provision, security requirements were within the 
court's equitable discretion. 106 This conclusion obviously contem-
plated the discretionary waiver of security requirements, guided by 
the usual considerations underlying an exercise of equitable discre-
tion, including a consideration of the impact the court's remedial 
order would have upon the public interest. 107 
Starting in the early nineteenth century, however, civil procedure 
codes began to provide for preliminary injunction bonds in terms 
102 See, infra notes 175-77, 180 and accompanying text. 
103 Pasteur Chamberland Filter Co. v. Funk, 52 F. 146, 147 (N.D. Ill. 1892). 
104 See Kerz v. Galena Water Co., 139 Ill. App. 598, 602 (1908) (dicta); O'Beirne v. City of 
Elgin, 187 Ill. App. 581, 588 (1914). 
105 105 U.S. 433 (1881). 
106 Id. at 441-42. 
107 According to Pomeroy, writing in 1881, the same year as the Russell v. Farley decision, 
equity had an "inherent capacity" to meet changing social needs, since it was not governed 
by rigid precedents but by a system of flexible maxims and rules. See J. POMEROY, EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE § 67 (Symons ed. 1941). The courts' equitable discretion was thus seen by 
contemporary writers as encompassing more than a power to effect just compromises between 
the individual parties. It included a power to shape public policy, at least with respect to 
equitable remedies and other matters over which the equity courts had jurisdiction. This view 
of equity has survived to the modern day. See, e.g., the statement of the Supreme Court in 
Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. at 329-30, cited supra note 78. 
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that appeared mandatory. Some, like the N ew York Code of 1848, 
provided that "the judge shall require a written undertaking on the 
part of the plaintiff. "108 Others, like the later, federal bond provision 
of the Clayton Act of 1914,109 which survives intact as Rule 65(c), 
stated that bond "shall" be required, but left the amount of the bond 
within the discretion of the trial judge. The enactment of mandatory 
statutory or rule of civil procedure bond requirements served to 
curtail the equity courts' authority discretionarily to except appli-
cants. Although the federal courts permitted a few limited excep-
tions,l1O most courts in jurisdictions with mandatory provisions did 
not view the decision whether to impose bond as susceptible of an 
equitable weighing of the interests involved. 111 Bond requirements 
took on a rigid, legal112 character, rather than a flexible, equitable 
character and a sharp division arose between the discretionary de-
cision-making process governing the grant of a preliminary injunc-
tion and the nondiscretionary application of bond requirements. 113 
lOS Ch. 379, § 195, [1848] Laws of New York 534. 
109 Ch. 323, § 18, 38 Stat. 738 (1914). 
110 These exceptions were where the court issued an injunction to protect its subject matter 
jurisdiction and when it stayed its own hand in the calendaring process. See Dobbs, supra 
note 17, at 1100. 
111 See, e.g., Chatz v. Freeman, 204 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1958) (Rule 65(c) is not a discretionary 
provision); Bayham v. Funk, 3 Ariz. App. 220, 413 P.2d 279 (1965) (state bond provision 
patterned after the federal rule given a mandatory interpretation). See also 11 C. WRIGHT & 
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2954, at 524 ("The conclusion seems 
inescapable that once the court decides to grant relief under Rule 65(c) it must require security 
from the applicant."). 
112 Since Rule 65(c) as part of the federal rules was enacted into law by Congress, it had 
the force of law. See supra note 83. 
113 Attempts have been made by some courts to bridge the gap between the preliminary 
injunction and bond determinations in the setting of a regulated party's cha.llenge to a rate 
setting scheme. In this setting, courts have considered a factor in issuing an injunction the 
plaintiff's ability to post a bond adequate to indemnify the other affected regulated parties 
and to offset any harm to the public interest. See, e.g., Beaumont, S.L. & W. Ry. v. United 
States, 282 U.S. 74, 91-92 (1930) (lower court did not abuse its discretion in granting a. stay 
of an ICC order, where appellants' bond of three million dollars indemnified the affected 
regulated parties and postponement of the ICC order would inflict no loss upon the public); 
Virginia Ry. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 672-74 (1926) (appeal bond could not indemnify 
affected mines and railroad for harm resulting from stay of ICC order, and "the public might 
suffer losses for which there could be no remedy"). See also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 
414, 440-41 (1943) ("Where an injunction is asked which will adversely affect a public interest 
for whose impairment, even temporarily, an injunction bond cannot compensate, the court 
may in the public interest withhold relief until a final determination of the rights of the parties, 
though the postponement may be burdensome to the plaintiff") (dicta). These cases suggest 
that, at least where the public interest is involved, it is appropriate for the courts to consider 
the preliminary injunction and bond determinations in light of one another, and that some 
accommodation between these two determinations should be made in the context of suits 
1985] BOND REQUIREMENTS 145 
Such a discrepancy was not critical where the parties were contend-
ing commercial interests, and the plaintiff had enough financial back-
ing to post a bond. Where the applicant was a public interest plaintiff 
lacking funding, however, the discrepancy between the court's treat-
ment of the preliminary injunction and bonding determinations be-
came very clear. Bonding requirements blocked judicial access and 
prevented the court from deciding justiciable public interest cases 
on the merits. 
B. Modern Bond Requirements 
Today, general statutory or rule of civil procedure bond provisions 
determine a court's ability to except applicants from bond require-
ments. Currently, the federal courts and all state courts (with the 
exception of Massachusetts) have such general bond provisions. 114 
The majority appear to be stated in mandatory terms. 115 Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), which has been copied by a number 
of states,116 provides that bond "shall" be required but allows the 
amount of the bond to be set "in such sum as the court deems 
proper."l17 Although the federal courts interpreted Rule 65(c) as a 
mandatory provision for the first forty years of its history,118 about 
halfl19 of the circuits now consider it a discretionary provision, rea-
soning that the phrase "such sum as the court deems proper" literally 
allows the trial judge to dispense with the bond. 120 However, there 
is little difference in the way that federal courts subscribing to 
"discretionary" or "mandatory" interpretations of Rule 65(c) treat 
the bond requirement: with few exceptions, bonds are automatically 
brought by public interest litigants challenging government actions potentially harmful to the 
public interest. 
114 Dobbs, supra note 17, at 1096-97. 
115Id. at 1096-99. 
116Id. at 1101. 
117 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). 
118 Dobbs, supra note 17, at 1100. 
119 See, e.g., Urbain v. Knapp Bros. Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 
349 U.S. 930 (1955); Corrigan Dispatch Co. v. Casa Guzman, F.A., 569 F.2d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 
1978); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027, 1035 (7th Cir. 1972); Continental Oil Co. v. Frontier 
Refining Co., 338 F.2d 780 (10th Cir. 1964); Ferguson v. Tabah, 288 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1961). 
The First Circuit also apparently treats Rule 65(c) as a discretionary provision, although it 
has not expressly held that it is discretionary. See Crowley, 697 F.2d at 1000 and discussion 
infra notes 185-201 and accompanying text. 
120 This rationale was first articulated by the Sixth Circuit in Urbain v. Knapp Bros. Mfg. 
Co., 217 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 930 (1955). 
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imposed, at a level measured by the defendant's potential economic 
loss. 121 
That a majority of jurisdictions have enacted mandatory bond 
provisions differentiates the modern conception of the requirement 
from the older, equity view. The current rules evidently see the 
requirement as providing an important source of insurance for the 
enjoined party that should not be subject to the trial judge's discre-
tion. Consistent with this "insurance" conception of bonding require-
ments, most jurisdictions automatically impose liability on bonds 
when the applicant fails to obtain a favorable final determination on 
the merits. l22 Accordingly, liability is triggered in almost all cases, 
even those in which the erroneous issuance of relief is not the ap-
plicant's fault. 123 
III. FEDERAL COURT BOND PRACTICES AND THE EMERGING 
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION EXEMPTION 
The enactment of mandatory bond provisions suggests that mod-
ern courts, unlike their equity predecessors, cannot discretionarily 
exempt applicants from bond requirements. Faced with apparently 
"mandatory" bond provisions, however, courts have nevertheless 
acted in appropriate cases to "nominalize" bonds, and, in some cases 
have declined to require a bond at all. On the federal level, there 
has been no difference between courts subscribing to "discretionary" 
or "mandatory" interpretations of Rule 65(c) - courts subscribing 
to either interpretation have equally as easily exempted public in-
terest applicants from the bond requirement. 124 As sueh a pattern 
suggests, the critical factor has not been whether the court holds to 
a "discretionary" or "mandatory" interpretation of the Rule. Rather, 
it has been the crucial recognition that bond requirements have little 
121 See, e.g., Reinders Bros. v. Rain Bird Eastern Sales Corp., 627 F.2d 44, 54 (7th Cir. 
1980) (court must entertain and expressly rule on request for bond, and errs in not granting 
request, unless there are extraordinary circumstances). 
122 Note, The Triggering of Liability on Injunction Bonds, 52 N.C.L. REV. 1252, 1276 (1974) 
[hereinafter cited as The Triggering of Liability on Injunction Bonds]. However, in a few 
cases the federal courts have avoided holding plaintiffs liable on bonds where a change of law 
occurred during the period the case was under decision, rendering the injullction erroneous. 
See Interlocutory Injunctions, supra note 48, at 342. 
123 See The Triggering of Liability on Injunction Bonds, supra note 122, at 1276. 
124 For instance, courts in the First Circuit have waived or nominalized bond requirements 
despite the Circuit's never having ruled that Rule 65(c) is discretionary. See Boston Waterfront 
Residents v. Romney, 343 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1972); Silva v. Romney, 342 F. Supp. 783 
(D. Mass. 1972); Crowley v. Local No. 82 Furniture and Piano Movers, 697 F.2d 978 (lst Cir. 
1982). 
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place in the public interest context - that in the public interest 
context they unjustly burden125 applicants with limited financial re-
sources, prevent the realization of congressionally-intended citizen 
enforcement schemes,126 function as an absolute bar to relief rather 
than a selective screening device,127 and prevent the litigation of 
public interest suits that the court has determined are worthy of 
judicial consideration. 128 Against such a realization, courts have been 
willing to expose government agencies and commercial entities to 
the risk of erroneous relief, reasoning that the public interest value 
of the suit outweighs any damage to the defendant or the conflicting 
social policies that it might represent, 129 that the defendant's financial 
resources make it a vastly superior carrier of the risk of an erroneous 
injunction than the public interest plaintiff,130 and that the prelimi-
nary injunction test provides sufficient insurance against an improv-
idently-issued injunction. 131 The federal courts have exempted public 
interest applicants from bond requirements primarily in two situa-
tions - where the applicant is an indigent132 or is enforcing the 
National Environmental Protection Act (NEP A).l33 They have also 
occasionally exempted bond requirements where the applicant is 
seeking judicial review of administrative action,l34 litigating consti-
tutional issues,135 or, most recently, litigating under the Labor-Man-
agement Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA).136 
Viewed collectively, these exemptions seem to cover a significant 
portion of public interest suits, which raises the question of the 
necessity of a general theory of equitable consideration of public 
interest cases. However, the current patchwork of existing excep-
tions leaves arbitrary gaps in the application of equitable discretion 
to public interest litigation generally. With the exception of one 
circuit,137 the federal courts have tended to view the recognized bond 
125 See infra text and notes at notes 138-163. 
126 See infra text and notes at notes 145--55, 164-84. 
127 See infra text and notes at note 207. 
128 See infra text and notes at notes 158-63. 
129 See infra text and notes at notes 172-74. 
130 See infra text and notes at notes 145--57, 175-78. 
131 See infra text and notes at notes 151--57. 
132 See infra text and notes at notes 138-63. 
133 See infra text and notes at notes 164-84. 
134 See, e.g., Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. Dep't of Housing and Urban Affairs, 
284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968). 
135 Denny v. Health and Social Services Board, 285 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Wis. 1968). 
136 See Crowley v. Local No. 82 Furniture and Piano Movers, discussed infra at notes 185-
201 and accompanying text. 
137 [d. 
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exceptions as piece meal departures from Rule 65(c), and have there-
fore failed to develop a unified approach. Public interest litigants 
who do not fall squarely under one of the recognized exemptions 
may have difficulty obtaining an exemption. 
Even though public interest litigants are currently likely to obtain 
bond exemptions in only a limited number of situations, close ex-
amination of the federal case law suggests that, over the past twenty 
years, the federal courts have developed a general public interest 
bond exemption. This section discusses three sets of key cases es-
tablishing this federal practice, and suggests that the federal courts 
are returning to an equity conception of the bond determination. In 
so doing, courts are assuming broad discretion to except applicants 
from bonding requirements whenever their imposition would block 
litigation calculated to advance the public interest. 
A. The Indigent Exemption Cases: Denny v. Health and Social 
Services Board, Bass v. Richardson, and Bartels v. Biernat 
In the late 1960's and early 1970's, with the advent of class actions 
in which welfare recipients challenged the states' administration of 
government benefits programs, the federal courts created a bond 
exemption for indigents. Three representative cases ar€~ Denny v. 
Health and Social Services Board,l38 Bass v. Richardson,139 and 
Bartels v. Biernat. 140 These cases establish the general principle that 
the federal courts have been unwilling to condition preliminary relief 
upon the applicant's financial resources, at least when the applicant 
is a poor individual. This principle appears to arise from the court's 
equitable discretion, rather than from any statutory policy or con-
stitutional rightl41 mandating a bond exemption. 
138 285 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Wis. 1968). 
139 338 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N. Y. 1971). 
140 405 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. Wis. 1975). 
141 It is unlikely that a direct constitutional challenge to Rule 65(c) could be mounted on 
equal protection or due process grounds. In Lindsey v. Norrnet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), the Court 
held that Oregon's wrongful detainer statute violated the equal protection clause because its 
double appeal bond requirement discriminated against tenants appealing wrongful detainer 
decisions. However, in Lindsey no other class of Oregon litigants was required to post a 
double appeal bond. Rule 65(c), on the other hand, applies to all injunction applicants. Based 
on the Court's test in Boddie v. Connecticut, a due process challenge to Rule 65(c) seems 
equally implausible. See Dobbs, supra note 17, at 1113-21. The Denny court could, however, 
have reasoned that the constitutional issues at stake strongly urged an override of the bond 
requirement, thus making what was essentially a discretionary exemption appear "manda-
tory." The court in Bass v. Richardson, and the courts in the NEPA bond exemption cases, 
took such an approach, in part. See infra notes 145-58, 164-84 and accompanying text. 
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In Denny v. Health and Social Services Board, the court simply 
noted that the plaintiffs were proceeding in forma pauperis142 and 
summarily stated: "[The plaintiffs] are by hypothesis unable to fur-
nish security, as contemplated in Rule 65(c), and the court shall 
order no security in connection with this preliminary injunction."143 
The issue in Denny involved the plaintiffs' fourteenth amendment 
challenge to Wisconsin's statutory requirement that, to be eligible 
for public assistance, applicants must have continuously resided in 
the state for one year. l44 The Denny court could have held that the 
constitutional issues at stake provided a compelling reason to depart 
from the dictates of Rule 65(c). Its statement that the plaintiffs were 
"unable to furnish security as contemplated by Rule 65(c)" is the 
court's only express rationale for waiving the security requirement. 
This rationale is notable for the conspicuous absence of any consti-
tutional override reasoning. Thus, two inferences can be drawn from 
the court's waiver of the security requirements in Denny. First, 
since the court did not rely on constitutional authority to waive the 
security requirement, it must have relied on its equity powers. 
Second, while it did not expressly state its rationale for granting the 
waiver, its decision would appear to be based on the theory that it 
would be unjust to an individual to block adjudication for want of 
money, or on the theory that the legal system itself has an interest 
in having justiciable issues adjudicated in the judicial forum (rather 
than the streets), or both. Faced with blocking the indigent plaintiffs' 
access to court by requiring a bond they could not provide, the court 
waived the security requirement in a clear demonstration of its 
reluctance to condition judicial access upon the parties' financial 
resources. 
Bass v. Richardson, decided in 1971, reiterated the Denny court's 
holding that bond should not be required of indigents. 145 The court, 
however, built upon the reasoning in Denny: where the applicants 
litigated under a statute envisioning a private enforcement scheme, 
the statute's policies implicitly overrode Rule 65(c), necessitating a 
bond exemption. 146 The plaintiffs in Bass were indigent recipients of 
medicaid benefits who challenged the State of N ew York's benefits 
reductions. 147 Citing Denny for the proposition that indigents ordi-
142 285 F. Supp. at 527. 
143Id. 
144 Id. 
145 338 F. Supp. at 490. 
145 Id. at 491. 
147 I d. at 490-91. 
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narily should not be required to post bond,148 the court in Bass went 
on to conclude that the Social Security Act's legislative history in-
dicated that Congress intended parties "adversely affected" by im-
proper administration of Social Security Act programs to seek ju-
dicial review. 149 Requiring the posting of a bond would discourage 
litigation seeking such review, and was therefore inconsistent with 
Congressional intent. 150 The court also stated that the preliminary 
injunction standard adequately protected the defendant-state from 
the erroneous issuance of relief,151 that the Social Security Act con-
trolled Rule 65(c),152 and that the "allocation of the risk of not com-
plying with federal law in a comprehensive program to promote 
national health . . . rests upon the defendant governmental bodies 
whose administration of the program is at issue. "153 
The decision in Bass can, and has,154 been read to create a narrow 
exception for indigent civil plaintiffs seeking judicial review of ad-
ministrative action. An alternative, equally narrow holding is that 
bonds should not be imposed upon indigent applicants seeking review 
under the Social Security Act. However, the Bass decision stands 
for much broader equitable principles. Like Denny, the B£tss decision 
was based on the idea that it was unjust to require bonds of individ-
uals when such a requirement blocked judicial access. The principle 
that bond requirements should be waived where necessary to effect 
a congressionally-intended private enforcement scheme adds the fur-
ther equitable theory that the legal system has a positive interest 
in citizen enforcement, and that courts sitting in equity should waive 
bond requirements to encourage citizen suits. While it draws its 
rationale from a statute, this line of argument is essentially equitable 
- the Social Security Act did not explicitly require an exception to 
bond requirements, therefore the court must have independently 
determined that bond requirements should be waived. Underlying 
this determination is the recognition that the best enforcers of stat-
utes are individuals adversely affected by government action, since 
in many cases the government is part of the problem, unlikely to 
enforce a statutory command against itself. 155 
148 [d. at 490. 
149 [d. at 491. 
160 [d. 
151 [d. 
162 [d. 
153 [d. 
154 See Comm. to Save the Bishop's House v. Medical Center of Vermont, 338 A.2d 827, 136 
Vt. 213 (1978). 
155 As then-Circuit Judge Burger stated in Church of Christ, in the context of listener 
intervention in agency proceedings: 
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Bass also balanced the parties' individual harms, just as a court 
sitting in equity balances the harms in a preliminary injunction 
proceeding. Its statement that "the allocation of the risk of not 
complying with federal law . . . rests upon the defendant govern-
mental bodies whose administration of the program is at issue" 
embodies a comparison of the relative abilities of the plaintiffs and 
the defendant to bear the risk of erroneous relief. This balance at 
once focuses upon the abilities of the individual litigants to bear the 
risk of erroneous relief, and the larger policy ramifications of re-
quiring one or the other party to bear that risk. It is a balance 
colored, moreover, by a kind of equitable clean hands principle. 156 
Essentially, the Bass court refused to require a bond because the 
state had acted improperly, a refusal that is reminiscent of Pasteur 
Chamberland Filter Co. v. Funk, the 1892 case in which the court 
exempted the applicant from bond requirements because the en-
joined party had acted toward it in bad faith. 157 Finally, in stating 
that the defendant was adequately protected by the preliminary 
injunction standard, the Bass court added a final equitable theory: 
that injunction bonds were a superfluous protection against an er-
roneous grant of relief that the court, at least in the context of public 
interest suits, could dispense with at its discretion. 
The Bass court's approach was extended in 1975, by the court in 
Bartels v. Biernat. 158 Bartels involved a suit brought by a group of 
indigent handicapped persons who sought to enjoin the City of Mil-
waukee from executing a construction contract for public passenger 
buses because the City had failed to consider the needs of handi-
capped persons using the bus service. 159 The Bartels plaintiffs' chal-
lenge arose under the Mass Transportation Act of 1964 and the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 160 Citing Denny for the proposition that 
The theory that the Commission can always effectively represent the listener inter-
ests in a renewal proceeding without the aid and participation of legitimate listener 
representatives fulfilling the role of private attorneys general is one of those as-
sumptions we collectively try to work with so long as they are reasonably adequate. 
When it becomes clear, as it does to us now, that it is no longer a valid assumption 
which stands up under the realities of actual experience, neither we nor the Com-
mission can continue to rely on it. 
359 F.2d at 1003-04. 
156 It is a basic maxim of equity that the court will not intervene to protect a party who has 
not acted equitably; one must come into court with "clean hands." See J. STORY, COMMEN-
TARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 59 
(1836). 
157 See supra text and notes at note 84. 
158 405 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. Wis. 1975). 
159 [d. at 1014. 
160 [d. at 1015. 
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bonds should not be required where they would discourage suits "to 
remedy the more flagrant abuses in federal administrative pro-
grams,"161 the court waived the bond requirement. 162 However, un-
like the court in Bass, the Bartels court did not actually reason that 
the federal statutes under which the plaintiffs litigated demanded 
an exemption to Rule 65(c). Instead, it stated: "because the Court 
determined that the action concerns important social considerations, 
the Court would exercise [its] discretion to issue preliminary injunc-
tive relief ... without security. "163 This language suggests an even 
more expansive approach to bonding requirements than does the 
Bass court's language. While it must be read in light of the fact that 
the plaintiffs litigated under federal statutes, Bartels suggests that 
courts might except indigents from bonds because they find, in their 
equitable discretion, that the questions presented are of sufficient 
social significance to warrant an exemption. Bartels seems to con-
template, therefore, an equitable private attorney general exemp-
tion triggered by the court's equitable determination that the public 
interest impact of the litigation requires a waiver of Rule 65(c). 
The shift in judicial focus from Denny to Bartels _. from the 
applicant's identity as an indigent, to whether cases involve signifi-
cant social considerations - suggests that courts are starting to 
recognize a general public interest bond exemption. Dispensing with 
bond requirements because the applicant is an indigent creates a 
narrow exemption applying only to poor persons. Dispensing with 
bond requirements because they would prevent litigation of impor-
tant social issues creates a potentially expansive bond exemption 
that could be triggered whenever the court determines that a case 
affects the public interest. Furthermore, as a close examination of 
the three cases' reasoning suggests, the evolving federal public in-
terest exemption appears to be grounded in equity. Thus, while the 
federal indigent cases arose under statutory causes of action, the 
courts went far beyond an equitable exemption based on the realiza-
tion of congressional intent. They relied on other quintessentially 
equitable principles, such as the fairness of requiring bond from 
indigents, the balance of the defendant's and plaintiff's harms, the 
superior ability of government defendants to bear the risk of erro-
neous relief, the protections afforded by the preliminary injunction 
test, and the legal system's interest in the adjudication of public 
161 Id. at 1019. 
162 Id. 
168 Id. 
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interest suits. Denny, Bass, and Bartels thus suggest that the 
emerging federal exemption is a broad-based dispensation that ap-
plies to a wide variety of public interest cases - not just to those 
brought by indigents under the particular statutes represented by 
the indigent bond exemption cases. 
B. The NEPA Litigation Exemption: Natural Resources Defense 
Council v. Morton, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Brinegar, and 
Monarch Chemical Co. v. Exon 
The equitable nature of the emerging federal public interest dis-
pensation is further established by a line of casesl64 litigated under 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), in which courts 
utilized a balancing of the equities to decline to require bonds. Like 
Bass, the courts in these cases reasoned that bond requirements 
should be waived because Congress intended a citizen enforcement 
scheme, and without a bond exemption citizen litigation would be 
effectively barred. NEP A's enforcement scheme is only implicit, 
however - no citizen suit provision appears on the face of the Act. 
N or, as one might expect, does the Act mention that bond require-
ments should be waived for NEPA litigants. While at first glance, 
the courts appeared to exempt NEPA litigants because NEP A's 
statutory policy overrode Rule 65(c), such an "override" could only 
have been very indirect, and could not possibly have amounted to 
anything like a direct statutory authorization for a bond exemption. 
Rather, the courts, in their equitable discretion, determined that 
the public interest value of NEP A suits outweighed both the poten-
tial harm to the defendant-government and the public's interest in 
administrative efficiency and conservation of tax revenues. 
In form, the NEP A cases had two discrete steps. First, courts 
held that the citizen enforcement policy of the Act afforded a reason 
for departing from Rule 65(c). Second, they formally balanced the 
equities, utilizing elements drawn from the federal preliminary in-
junction test, to determine whether an exemption was appropriate 
in the particular case. The balancing of the equities functioned in 
164 Many more NEPA cases waived or nominalized bond requirements than actually engaged 
in equitable balancing. The following cases represent the major ones that engaged in equitable 
balancing: Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C. 1972), 
remanded, 473 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1972); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 337 
F. Supp. 167 (D. D.C. Cir. 1971), aff'd 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Friends of the Earth v. 
Brinegar, 518 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1975); Monarch Chemical Co. v. Exon, 452 F. Supp. 493 (D. 
Neb. 1978). See supra note 66 for a general listing of NEPA bond exemption cases, including 
cases which did not balance the equities. 
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two ways. First, it enabled the court to take stock of the general 
positions of the parties, to determine whether a bond exemption was 
appropriate with respect to the parties' individual capacities to bear 
the risk of an erroneous injunction. It allowed the courts to weigh, 
for instance, the plaintiff's financial need for an exemption, the 
likelihood that the defendant would be erroneously enjoined, and the 
extent of the damage that the defendant might suffer. Because par-
ties to public interest suits only putatively represent their own 
interests and actually represent conflicting public interests,l65 the 
balancing of the equities also enabled the court to weigh the larger 
"public equities" of a bond exemption: whether the public interest 
value of the litigation outweighed the defendant's need for financial 
protection, and which type of party, government defendant or public 
interest plaintiff, could and should be expected to bear the risk of 
an erroneous injunction. 
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton,166 for instance, 
the court first noted that previous federal bond exemptions cases 
waived bond requirements where necessary to enable judicial review 
of administrative action. 167 It reasoned that to require the plaintiffs 
to post the $750,000 minimum security requested by the defendant 
would block judicial review and contravene Congress' intention that 
environmental groups enforce NEPA.I68 Conceivably, the NRDC 
court could have ended its analysis at this point, allowing the opinion 
to stand for the proposition that the legislative policy underlying 
NEPA superseded the Rule 65(c) policy of defendant protection. The 
court went on, however, to a further equitable consideration of the 
166 Plaintiffs in public interest suits only putatively represent their own interests. As the 
Court in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc. stated, speaking specifically of suits under 
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: 
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that enforcement 
would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in part upon private 
litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with the law. A Title II suit is 
thus private in form only. When a plaintiff brings an action under the Title, he cannot 
recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone, but 
also as a "private attorney general," vindicating a policy that Congress considered 
of the highest priority . . . . 
390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968). 
As a result, when the court balances the equities in an injunction determination, it in effect 
balances the harm to the social policy that the plaintiff represents against the harm to the 
policy that the defendant represents - or the "public equities." The public interest factor in 
the preliminary injunction determination also involves a balancing of conflicting social policies. 
166 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1971), aft'd, 
458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
167Id. at 168. 
168 Id. 
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issue that drew on factors from the preliminary injunction test typ-
ically employed by the federal courts. 
The first factor that the court considered was the irreparability of 
harm that the plaintiff-environmental group sought to prevent -
damage to a 7.9 million acre estuarine coastal marsh complex on the 
Outer Continental Shelf, from government oil exploration leasing. 169 
The court described the Shelf Region as a most important natural 
resource to the nation as a whole and characterized the affected 
complex as "vital" to fish and wildlife, a part of a delicate ecosystem 
that had been produced by a "fortuitous" combination of natural 
conditions. 17o Essentially, the court described the marsh as an eco-
nomically and recreationally significant resource whose perfect eco-
logical equilibrium could be spoiled by the proposed leasing activity. 
While it did not specifically find that the leasing would irreparably 
harm the marsh complex, the court's dramatic description suggests 
at least a presumption of irreparable harm,171 and recognizes that 
such harm would be suffered by the public, not just the particular 
litigants. 
The court next balanced the plaintiff's and defendant's prospective 
harms. Noting that "revenue losses" to the government were not 
the same as "pecuniary damage" to a private party,172 the court 
stated: "the court believes that the public interest will be far more 
gravely damaged by the failure of the courts to enforce NEPA than 
by any harm which could possibly result from delaying this . lease 
sale long enough to resolve the important legal issues presented by 
this suit."173 This statement compares the prospective harm to the 
government of an unsecured injunction -loss of revenues from lease 
sales - with the prospective harm to the environmental plaintiff of 
a secured injunction - the evisceration of NEP A's environmental 
impact statement requirement. Since the parties represented con-
flicting public interests, such an equitable balancing also incorpo-
rated the third preliminary injunction factor that the NRDC court 
considered: the impact upon the public interest of the remedial op-
tions under consideration. It is, of course, a fundamental principle 
of equitable discretion that courts can and should balance the broader 
169Id. at 167. 
17°Id. at 168. 
171 This interpretation of the court's treatment of the irreparable harm factor is discussed 
in Note, Injunction Bond Amounts in Federal NEPA Litigation, 61 IOWA L. REV. 580, 588 
(1975). 
172 337 F. Supp. at 168. 
17. Id. 
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interests lying behind the particular parties. 174 Thus, the court's 
consideration of the public interest, unavoidable as it was because 
any balancing of the individual litigants' harms involved a balancing 
of public harms, harmonized with equity's broad power to craft relief 
in view of its effect upon the public interest. 
The court's two-step process in NRDC was repeated in Friends 
of the Earth, Inc. v. Brinegar,175 which was decided three years 
after NRDC, in 1975. Friends of the Earth involved a challenge by 
a nonprofit environmental organization to compel the City of San 
Francisco to prepare an environmental impact statement before com-
mitting funds to the expansion of San Francisco International Air-
port: In declining to require a bond, the court noted with approval 
the plaintiffs' argument that a bond would undermine NEPA's pri-
vate enforcement scheme. 176 It also considered persuasive the fact 
that another panel of the the court had previously determined that 
the plaintiffs had a high likelihood of success on the merits. 177 Finally, 
the court relied on the fact that the government defendant, unlike a 
private defendant, could easily bear the damage resulting from an 
erroneous injunction,178 a rationale that implicitly incorporates the 
idea that public interest plaintiffs, who typically have less money 
than private interest defendants, should not be expected to post 
bonds. Both a likelihood of success on the merits and a balancing of 
the ability of the parties to bear the costs of relief are part of the 
preliminary injunction determination. 
In addition to weighing the individual and "public" equities, the 
courts have used an equitable approach to separate commercial, 
private interest litigants from non-commercial, public interest liti-
gants. In the case of commercial litigants, bond exemptions have not 
been made. In Monarch Chemical Co. v. Exon,179 a 1978 NEPA 
case, the court imposed bond requirements after balancing the plain-
tiff chemical company's financial ability to post a $10,000 bond against 
the defendant state's 'ability to bear the cost of an erroneous injunc-
17. For instance, in the permanent injunction setting courts have denied relief to plaintiffs, 
even where the plaintiffs have established a cognizable injury, on the grounds that enjoining 
the defendant's activities would have grave economic consequences for the surrounding local 
community. See, e.g., Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper, & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 
S.W. 658 (1904); Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 18 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1927). 
176 518 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1975). 
176 [d. at 799. 
177 [d. 
178 [d. 
17·452 F. Supp. 493 (D. Neb. 1978). 
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tion. ISO The chemical company was mounting a challenge under 
NEPA to halt an eminent domain proceeding against its own prop-
erty, a fact that the court noted in its earlier discussion concerning 
whether relief should issue. 181 The court used equitable balancing to 
refuse the company a bond exemption. Its denial of an exemption, 
despite the plaintiff's perfectly valid NEPA claim, indicates that the 
underlying reason for the court's refusal to exempt the company was 
the company's status as a noncommercial, private interest litigant. 
This rationale would tend to further prove that the NEP A exemption 
is based on the court's equity powers, not on any implied statutory 
authorization from NEP A. 
The NEP A cases indicate that the federal courts are moving to-
ward the recognition of an equitable public interest exemption. The 
courts' balance of the equities indicates that the decision to waive 
bond is incomplete without some consideration of the impact a se-
cured or unsecured injunction would have upon the parties' interests, 
and the case's "public equities." The importance of equitable balanc-
ing in the NEP A cases beyond the override element is emphasized 
by the fact that NEP A contains no provision for judicial enforce-
ment. l82 It is not at all clear that Congress contemplated that any 
citizen suits would be brought under the Act. l83 Indeed, the legis-
lative history is silent as to citizen enforcement. l84 Thus, the NEPA 
cases indicate that the courts are moving towards creation of a broad 
dispensation for public interest law suits in general, not just one for 
law suits brought under statutory private enforcement schemes. 
C. The Emerging Federal Public Interest Exemption: Crowley v. 
Local No. 82, Furniture and Piano Movers 
Decided in 1982 by the First Circuit, Crowley v. Local No. 82 
Furniture and Piano M overs 185 created the first and the only bond 
exemption test developed by a federal court. The test confirms a 
180 Id. at 503. In accordance with Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Brinegar, the Monarch court 
considered that the plaintiff had a likelihood of success on the merits in its balance of the 
equities. Id. It found, however, this factor less persuasive than had the Brinegar court, since 
it required the plaintiffs to post bond in reliance on the fact that they had the financial 
resources to provide security, and on the fact that the defendant-state needed partial in-
demnity.ld. 
1811d. at 499. 
182 See King & Plater, supra note 29, at 27 and note 2. 
188 Anderson, supra note 70, at 1-14. 
184 I d. at 15. 
185 697 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1982). 
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trend toward a general, equitable public interest bond exemption 
suggested by the indigent and NEP A cases. First, the court in 
Crowley viewed the plaintiff access problem posed by Rule 65(c) as 
a recurring one that required a general test. Unlike the NEPA 
courts, the Crowley court fashioned a bond exemption test applicable 
to all public interest cases. Second, as discussed in the following 
section, the test in Crowley was a fundamentally "equitable" test 
whose triggering event was the noncommercial, public interest sta-
tus of the plaintiff. 
The court began by summarizing the district court decision. l86 In 
Crowley, the plaintiffs were union members who sued their local, as 
well as certain of its officers. They brought the action under the 
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) to en-
join the tabulation of the union's election results and to order a new 
election. l87 The district court waived the bond requirement on the 
ground that bonds would discourage the enforcement of the union 
members' Title I LMRDA rights. l88 It also engaged in a balancing 
of three factors drawn from the federal preliminary injunction test: 
the harm to the enjoined party an injunction posed, the plaintiff's 
likelihood of success on the merits, and the plaintiff's ability to post 
bond. l89 On appeal, the First Circuit refused to base its decision 
concerning whether the lower court had acted improperly on a de-
termination of the "mandatory" or "discretionary" status of the fed-
eral rule. l90 Instead, the court relied on past federal bonding prac-
tices. 
It divided bond cases into two types. The first type involved 
commercial cases where an unsecured injunction exposed the defen-
dant to a risk of monetary IOSS.191 In these cases, the courts required 
bonds. l92 The second type of case involved "important federal rights 
or 'public interests'" brought, often by indigents, under remedial 
social legislation. 193 In these cases, the courts waived or nominalized 
bond requirements. 194 After dividing the federal case law into "com-
mercial" and "public interest" types, the court constructed its ex-
emptions test. 
186 Id. at 999. 
187 Id. at 982. 
188 Id. at 999. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 1000. 
191Id. 
192 Id. 
198Id. 
lIN Id. 
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The test resembled the two-step analysis used in NRDC v. Mor-
ton. The Crowley court, however, balanced the equities first, and 
then considered the bond requirement's impact upon the enforce-
ment of statutorily created federal rights. In noncommercial cases, 
the district courts were first to consider the harm to the defendant 
of an unsecured injunction with the burden upon the plaintiff of 
posting security. 195 The court distinguished between commercial and 
non-commercial cases because commercial plaintiffs could be pre-
sumed to have the financial resources to post bond. l96 Second, "in 
order not to restrict a federal right unduly," the district courts were 
to consider the "impact that a bond requirement would have upon 
the enforcement of the right. "197 One factor in determining this 
impact was the relative positions of the plaintiff and the defendant. 198 
Where the plaintiff and defendant were both individuals or institu-
tions, the impact was not as great as where the plaintiff was an 
individual over whom the defendant institution had some control. 199 
Applying the test, the First Circuit reasoned that the absence of 
a bond would pose no "great burden" on individual officers named 
as defendants because the local would bear any costs resulting from 
an erroneous injunction. 20o The court noted that the bond require-
ment would adversely affect the enforcement of Title I LMRDA 
rights because individual union members were at a great financial 
disadvantage in litigating against unions. 201 
The Crowley court synthesizes the equity and legislative lines of 
reasoning in Bass v. Richardson and NRDC v. Morton in an attempt 
generically to describe the type of public interest case meriting a 
bond exemption. While the NEPA cases may have suggested that 
the court could not exempt plaintiffs from bond requirements in the 
absence of a compelling legislative policy, the Crowley court forever 
dispels this notion. Crowley's starting point, after all, is the noncom-
mercial, public interest status of the plaintiff. The court never states 
that bond exemptions should be granted only where necessary to 
effect a statutory private enforcement scheme. Furthermore, its 
"federal rights" factor focuses on the individual's ability to exercise 
its rights, suggesting that this factor was one in a set of equitable 
195Id. 
196 Id. 
197Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201Id. 
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considerations focusing upon the individual equities of the case, in-
cluding, as the court's balancing of harms indicates, a comparison of 
the particular litigants' abilities to bear an erroneous injunction. 
Finally, the measure supplied by the court for determining the im-
pact of bonding upon federal rights is curiously equitable. The factor 
- a comparison of the applicant's and enjoined party's status as 
individual or institution - is an equitable consideration of the ap-
plicant's financial need for a bond exemption, as the court's appli-
cation of this factor demonstrates. 
The bond exemptions test articulated by the court in Crowley is 
a general, equitable one applicable to all public interest litigants. It 
can be seen as the culmination of the line of cases beginning with 
Denny v. Health and Social Services Board, and extending through 
the NEPA bond exemptions cases. In making bond exemptions avail-
able to public interest litigants, the Crowley decision ensures that 
federal public interest litigation will not be barred by the applicants' 
limited financial resources. The next section considers arguments 
supporting the federal bond exception from two other perspectives: 
the court's and the defendant's. 
IV. JUDICIAL TAILORING OF RELIEF, DEFENDANT PROTECTION, 
AND THE FEDERAL PUBLIC INTEREST EXEMPTION 
A. Rule 65(c) and the Court's Tailoring of Relief' the Contribution 
of the Federal Public Interest Bond Exemption 
One of the more striking effects the enactment of Rule 65(c) pro-
duced was a schism between the decision to grant a preliminary 
injunction and the decision to impose bond requirements. As dis-
cussed in Section II, both decisions had once been subject to the 
court's equitable discretion. However, the enactment of Rule 65(c), 
and the resulting mechanical, rather than flexible, application of bond 
requirements produced a nearly irreconcilable conflict. If the plaintiff 
lacked the financial resources to post bond, the court's decision to 
impose the bond requirement could vitiate its decision to grant relief. 
The court could not easily solve this dilemma, since it lacked the 
discretion to waive or nominalize the bond requirement. 
The situation produced by the enactment of a mandatory bond 
requirement can prevent public interest litigants from getting into 
court. It can also, however, disrupt the court's decision-making pro-
cess. The mandatory application of bond requirements makes the 
availability of relief turn on such. legally irrelevant factors as the 
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applicant's financial resources or the availability of a bondsman202 
willing to secure the injunction. In public interest cases, this result 
is particularly worrisome. The impact of public interest litigation 
requires the court to engage in a delicate balancing of all the public 
policy aspects of the case, a balancing process necessitated both by 
the public interest aspect of the issues, and, where the case involves 
injunctive relief, the balancing of harms and public interest elements 
of the injunction test.203 The policy aspects of public interest cases 
involving injunctive relief are particularly inescapable, in fact. In-
junctions, especially those involving government defendants, involve 
conflicting interests that extend beyond the parties to the lawsuit. 204 
Allowing legally irrelevant, random factors to undercut the court's 
decision to grant an injunction undermines the court's decision-mak-
ing process and results, at the very least, in a waste of judicial 
resources. At worst, it can result in a failure of the system to protect 
interests vital to the general welfare. 
In the public interest context, the bond requirement prevents the 
court from deciding fundamentally important legal issues. Public 
interest cases often involve recurring legal questions that result from 
the collision of conflicting social policies. The court's decision to grant 
a preliminary injunction in such a context is more than a decision to 
grant relief in the particular case; it is a policy decision validating 
the type of litigation presented by the injunction applicant - a 
judicial determination that the issues to be litigated, and the conflict 
of interests presented, are important enough to warrant litigation, 
even though the injunction making litigation possible exposes the 
enjoined defendant to a risk of loss. 
The value of the public interest exemption articulated in the Crow-
ley decision and the federal bond exceptions cases lies in its unifi-
cation of the discretionary preliminary injunction test and the bond-
ing decision. Under the evolving exemption, the court may adjust 
the bond requirement to permit the litigation of all public interest 
cases, and thereby avoid a vitiation of its decision to grant an in-
junction. The federal equitable bond exemption is more consistent 
with the discretionary view of Rule 65(c), a view that is gaining 
202 Bondsmen undertake to secure injunctions on the basis of the plaintiff's apparent financial 
ability to pay damages covered by the bond, not the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the 
merits. Dobbs, supra note 17, at 1113. 
20S See supra text and note at note 164. 
204 The recognition that injunctions involve an impact on the public interest is embodied in 
the public interest element of the preliminary injunction test. 
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currency,205 than is an exemption relying on the implied require-
ments of a statutory enforcement scheme. Finally, as the Crowley 
test demonstrates, an equitable, case-by-case approach to bond re-
quirements involves consideration of the defendant's risk of harm; 
thus, the defendant's interests are fully protected. 
Assuming arguendo that such a balance fails to protect the defen-
dant, the following section presents the argument that, at least in 
the public interest setting, a bond requirement fails to successfully 
to protect the defendant. This section also suggests that the bond 
requirement duplicates the preliminary injunction's function as a 
screening device for frivolous claims, and that therefore it may be 
dispensed with in public interest cases. 
B. Protection of the Defendant: Compensation, Deterrence, and 
the Preliminary Injunction Test. 
1. The Bond's Protective Functions in a Public Interest Litigation 
Context 
The bond requirement's two functions - deterrence of frivolous 
claims and compensation of the defendant - are often cited by 
commentators206 as compelling reasons for courts ordinarily to re-
quire security from injunction applicants. The "deterrence" argu-
ment holds that the bond premium and ultimate liability on the bond 
will discourage plaintiffs who have unsound claims for relief from 
filing for an injunction. The "compensation" argument holds that a 
bond is necessary to compensate the defendant for the harm that it 
might suffer if the court erroneously issues an injunction. Both of 
these arguments presume, however, that the applicant has the fi-
nancial resources to post bond. Since public interest plaintiffs typi-
cally lack the financial resources to post bonds, neither of the bond 
requirement's functions operate in a public interest litigation setting. 
A bond protects defendants from frivolous claims o~y where it 
can function as a screening device, to deter those applicants lacking 
a good faith belief in their petitions for injunctions. The requirement 
assumes that applicants will not be willing to lose money over cases 
in which they have no valid interest, or in which the factual or legal 
arguments are less than compelling. This assumption, however, is 
based on a further assumption: that the applicant can afford to post 
006 See supra text and notes at notes 114-123 for a summary of current federal interpreta-
tions of Rule 65(c). 
206 Dobbs, 8Upra note 17, at 1092. 
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a bond. Only where the applicant can afford to post a bond does its 
failure to provide security reflect its lack of good faith or the lack of 
meritoriousness of its petition. The typical public interest plaintiff's 
failure to post a bond says nothing about its good faith or confidence 
of success, or the strength of its claim for relief. For in the public 
interest context, the bond operates not as a screening device, elim-
inating some claims, but as a financial bar, blocking all claims. 207 
Similarly, the public interest litigant's lack of financial resources 
makes the bond's compensatory function inoperative. Ideally, the 
bond requirement provides a source of compensation for the defen-
dant in case of an erroneously issued injunction. In order for a bond 
to provide such compensation, however, the applicant must actually 
obtain preliminary relief. Without preliminary relief, the enjoined 
party suffers no harm on account of an injunction and there is no 
harm for which it can be compensated. In the context of private 
cases, applicants required to provide bonds are usually financially 
able to post them, and to obtain injunctions. In public interest cases, 
where applicants cannot post bond, the bond requirement can play 
no compensatory role. If the court attempts to protect the defendant 
by requiring a bond, the applicant is barred from obtaining the 
injunctive relief that occasioned the need for the bond in the first 
place. Requiring a bond thus removes a pre-condition to fulfillment 
of the requirement's compensatory function: that the defendant ac-
tually be enjoined. 
Because the bond requirement developed in a context in which 
applicants reasonably could be presumed to have the financial re-
sources to post bonds, it does not work well in the public interest 
context. In the public interest context, the only protection that it 
provides is the dubious one of shielding all defendants of a certain 
class - defendants in public interest suits brought by plaintiffs who 
cannot provide bonds - from the judicial decision to issue an in-
junction. Apart from the bond requirement's impact upon public 
interest plaintiffs' access to court, or its impact upon the court's 
decision to decide justiciable cases, the bond requirement's dysfunc-
tion in the public interest context would seem to provide ample 
reason for a public interest exemption. Furthermore, as the next 
section demonstrates, no defendant in a public interest case would 
be left unprotected in the absence of a bond. The preliminary in-
207 This argument was made by the Supreme Court with respect to double appeal bonds 
required by Oregon's wrongful detainer statute. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 78 
(1972). See also Henson & Gray, supra note 33, at 565-69. 
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junction test, which is specifically designed to screen frivolous 
claims, provides insurance against an erroneous issuance of relief. 
Since the test determines whether relief shall issue at all, it is the 
defendant's primary, and therefore best, protection. 
2. The Preliminary Injunction Test and the Protection of the 
Defendant 
The argument that a bond is neccessary to protect the defendant 
from the hazards of preliminary injunctive relief presumes that there 
is a substantial risk that the court will erroneously issue an injunc-
tion. This presumption seems questionable208 in the public interest 
setting, where the broad social and economic impacts of injunctions 
make judges especially circumspect about issuing relief.209 The de-
cision-making model provided by the preliminary injunction test, 
insures, moreover, that the chances are small that defendants will 
be erroneously enjoined. The difficulties of prevailing under the 
preliminary injunction test are magnified by the primary strategic 
disadvantages facing public interest litigants - lack of money and 
lack of information. Furthermore, both of these disadvantages them-
selves discourage the litigation of marginal cases. 
The four part test used by the federal courts limits the availability 
of relief. The plaintiff must establish: (1) a likelihood of success on 
the merits; (2) irreparable harm; (3) on balance the plaintiff's and 
defendant's harms favor a grant of relief; (4) the injunction will not 
adversely affect the public interest.210 The burden of proof is on the 
plaintiff on all four factors,211 a burden of proof which commentators 
agree is a comparatively heavy one.212 
The likelihood of success on the merits factor provides the court 
with a screening device, to eliminate frivolous claims for relief. It 
fulfills, therefore, one of the primary functions of the bond require-
ment. As the court in Friends of the Earth v. Brinegar 213 recognized, 
2Jl8 A number of courts have relied on the preliminary injunction test as a rationale for 
declining to require bonds. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323 (9th 
Cir. 1975); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); State of Alabama e,x rel Bagley 
Corps of Eng'rs, 411 F. Supp. 1261 (N.D. Ala. 1976); Bass v. Richardson, 338 F. Supp. 478 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
209 See Henson & Gray, supra note 33, at 566-67. 
210 For federal cases setting out the preliminary injunction standard, see note 19 and cases 
cited therein. 
211 See, e.g., Callaway, 489 F.2d at 573. 
212 Leubsdorf, supra note 17, at 547. 
213 518 F.2d 797. 
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the likelihood of success on the merits factor serves as an adequate 
substitute for the bond: where the plaintiff's case has weak facts214 
or where under the law it has a dubious right to final reliefl15 the 
court will deny preliminary relief. The likelihood of success factor is 
also relatively easy for the court to administer.216 It is at base the 
same type of determination that the court makes at the trial level. 
Although in the preliminary injunction proceeding the court usually 
decides on the basis of limited amounts of evidence and through an 
abbreviated hearing, these factors do not necessarily mean that its 
decision is less than trustworthy. Even at trial the court's decision 
is based on probabilities, rather than certainties. 217 Since in the 
preliminary injunction setting the court openly decides on the basis 
of tentative information, its decision to grant an injunction may issue 
after comparatively more circumspection and weighing of competing 
factors than in the trial setting, where the validity of facts and final 
legal determinations must be presumed. 
The public interest factor and the irreparable harm factor may be 
difficult for public interest plaintiffs to fulfill, since under either 
factor the court essentially balances the public policy that the plain-
tiff represents against that represented by the defendant. The public 
interest status of the plaintiff's case is thus no guarantee of relief. 
For example, in environmental cases, where the plaintiff challenges 
development activities, courts have found that the grant of a prelim-
inary injunction is adverse to the public interest where it would 
result in the goverment's loss of revenues, even where the defendant 
has allegedly violated a statute. 218 Other types of public interest 
cases may involve a balancing of conflicting social policies. In housing 
discrimination cases challenging government housing authorities' lo-
cation of public housing, the policy against racial discrimination may 
be outweighed by an urgent public need for low-cost shelter. 219 
The irreparable harm factor also may be a difficult one to prove. 
While some courts consider statutory violations to constitute irre-
parable harm,220 other courts have required public interest plaintiffs 
21. Developments in the Law: Injunctions, supra note 9, at 1056. 
21sId. 
216 Leubsdorf, supra note 17, at 555-56. 
217 Id. 
218 See, e.g., Florida Wildlife Federation, 506 F. Supp. at 372-73. 
219 See, e.g., Blackshear Residents Org. v. Romney, 472 F.2d 1197 (5th Cir. 1973). 
22IJSee Developments in the Law: Injunctions, supra note 9, at 1059. Some courts do not 
balance the equities at all where a statutory violation of NEP A has occurred. See Lathan v. 
Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971) (court held plaintiffs entitled to preliminary injunctive 
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to prove that a concrete, physical irreparable injury will result from 
the defendant's action. 221 This requirement may be quite difficult for 
public interest plaintiffs to fulfill, especially when litigating under 
statutes such as NEP A, where the statutory violation is essentially 
procedural. 
Success under the preliminary injunction test turns, moreover, on 
the quality of the public interest plaintiff's legal services and case 
preparation. To prove a likelihood of success on the merits requires 
a plaintiff to present its case in chief.222 While preliminary injunction 
motions are normally subject to a streamlined procedure,223 compli-
cated cases involving complex facts may force the parties to call on 
experts.224 At a stage of the proceedings characterized by an emer-
gency atmosphere, the public interest litigant may find itself pitted 
against a better-financed, better-organized government or industry 
defendant. In addition to the obstacles posed by the preliminary 
injunction test, the limited resources of public interest litigants may 
therefore provide an effective screening device: only well-litigated, 
well-thought-out cases are likely to succeed under the preliminary 
injunction standard, a reality for which public interest litigants with 
limited resources must account in deciding whether to litigate at all. 
Defendants in public interest cases are thus well-screened from the 
issuance of an erroneous injunction, even without the "screening" 
device provided by a bond. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Developed by the equity courts in a commercial, private interest 
setting, the bond requirement was designed to protect the defendant 
from two threats posed by a preliminary injunction: monetizable 
damage resulting from an erroneously-issued injunction, and the 
expense and nuisance of fending off frivolous claims for relief. As 
originally developed, the bond requirement was subject to the bal-
ance of private and public interests that is at the heart of equity's 
ability discretionarily to tailor relief. Thus, while the requirement 
focused on monetary damage to the defendant, the equity courts did 
not view it as conferring upon the defendant any right to protection 
relief without a balancing of the equities because the plaintiffs established a violation of 
NEPA). 
221 See Callaway, 489 F.2d at 574-76. 
222 Leshy, supra note 19, at 643. 
223 [d. 
224 See Florida Wildlife Fed'n v. Goldschmidt, 506 F. Supp. 350 (S.D. Fla. 1981), where the 
preliminary injunction hearing involved testimony from eleven experts. 
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by a bond. Courts could and did discretionarily waive bond require-
ments where indicated by a variety of equitable considerations, even 
if the defendant was subjected to a risk of monetary loss. 
While the enactment of mandatory bond provisions would seem to 
have removed the bonding decision from the court's equitable dis-
cretion, some jurisdictions with mandatory provisions have at least 
acknowledged the possibility of bond exemptions. The federal courts 
have gone beyond a mere acknowledgement, and, despite the seem-
ingly mandatory language of Rule 65(c), have evolved a general, 
equitable bond exemption for public interest litigants. They have led 
the way in recognizing that public interest litigants' lack of financial 
resources should not bar judicial access and prevent the litigation of 
public interest cases that have been deemed worthy of judicial con-
sideration. Returning to an equitable treatment of the bond require-
ment, the federal courts have considered a variety of factors in 
exempting bond, focusing both upon the requirement's impact upon 
public interest litigation, and the possible harm to the defendant of 
an unsecured injunction. 
The federal exemption demonstrates that bond can and should be 
waived by courts in the public interest litigation setting. The federal 
exemption's equitable character insures that both the defendant's 
and plaintiff's interests will be adequately considered by the court. 
The ad hoc balancing of equitable discretion provides a sensitive tool 
for separating meritorious public interest suits in which bond waiv-
ers are needed, from frivolous public interest suits, or from essen-
tially private interest suits in which the plaintiff can afford to post 
bond. Bond waivers based on an equitable balancing ensure, more-
over, that courts will consider the gravity of harm that an unsecured 
injunction poses to the defendant. 
As the various propositions underlying the federal bond exemption 
make clear, the bond requirement is of questionable utility in the 
public interest context. It fails to screen unmeritorious claims, ef-
fecting a financial bar to relief, instead. It duplicates the screening 
function provided by the preliminary injunction test. Finally, as this 
article has noted, the bond requirement performs no compensatory 
role, since it prevents the plaintiff from obtaining an injunction in 
the first place. Combined with the fact that the requirement bars 
the litigation of worthwhile public interest suits, the fact that it 
serves no deterrence or compensatory purpose creates a compelling 
case for a bond exemption. 
While the federal public interest bond exemption might be seen 
as a departure from prevailing bond practices, it can also be,seen as 
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a return to an equitable treatment of the bonding requirement ne-
cessitated by the special situation of public interest litigation. For 
while in the private interest setting the application of bond require-
ments poses no obstacle to relief, in the public interest setting it 
prevents the individual plaintiff from obtaining an injunction, ulti-
mately barring the litigation of cases protecting vital public inter-
ests. Sitting in equity but operating under the apparently mandatory 
Rule 65(c), the federal courts clearly have had difficulty ignoring the 
reality of the "equitable" decision to require bonds of public interest 
plaintiffs, and have looked behind the often-recited rubric of "defen-
dant protection" to confront what type of protection bond require-
ments would afford in the public interest context. The resulting 
equitable bond exemption, while responsive to the new situation 
presented by public interest litigation, is a return to an older con-
ception of bonding requirements whose time has come. 
